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5EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Th e consumer electronics industry utilises a signifi cant proportion of the global supply of several 
metals that are essential parts of mobile phones, computers and game consoles. One of the most 
serious sustainability issues is where minerals are extracted from confl ict areas such as Eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Despite a peace deal in 2003, people in the east of the 
country remain highly vulnerable and live in fear of rebel groups and the army. Tens of thousands 
of women, possibly hundreds of thousands, have been raped since the beginning of the war. Income 
from the extraction of four minerals (tin-ore cassiterite, tantalum-ore coltan, wolframite and gold) is 
evidently part of the unoffi  cial economy that sustains the deadly confl ict. 
Partly as a result of makeITfair reports and roundtable meetings on the subject, major electronics 
companies have accepted accountability for the extractives phase of their supply chains. Th e industry 
associations Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and Global e-Sustainability Initiative 
(GeSI) have established a working group on extractives and publically declared that they have a 
shared responsibility to address these urgent issues at the mine level. 
Recently, numerous eff orts and initiatives ranging from legislation to certifi cation have focused on 
the link between confl ict and the mineral trade from Eastern DRC. Despite the fact that all such 
initiatives aim to end the mineral trade funding armed groups in Eastern DRC, there is growing 
concern that there is a boycott in practice on minerals from Eastern DRC, which may lead to worse 
consequences for the people on ground.
Th is report especially wants to channel local voices from the concerned people and civil society 
in Eastern DRC. Th e makeITfair project sees it as crucial that the views and suggestions of those 
most dependent on mining and aff ected by insecurity in Eastern DRC are taken into account when 
corporate decisions on this issue are taken. On behalf of the makeITfair project, the International 
Peace Information Service (IPIS) interviewed representatives of relevant non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Eastern DRC and representatives of local mining authorities.
Th e UN Group of Experts on the DRC has released several reports documenting in detail how 
businesses, armed rebel groups and government actors are involved in the mineral trade. Several 
countries are currently involved in initiatives to curb the link between the mineral trade and the 
confl ict in Eastern DRC. In the US a law on disclosure of confl ict minerals from the DRC and 
adjoining countries has already been passed and similar legislation is in the pipeline. Th e German 
government is working with the Congolese Ministry of Mines to set up a certifi cation scheme. 
Th e international tin industry association ITRI has started a pilot project called iTSCi to trace 
and tag minerals from two major cassiterite mines. However, the selection of these mines is quite 
controversial due to the presence of the national army FARDC and highly questionable human 
rights situation at both sites. So far the iTSCi project has focused on the logistics of traceability. 
In mid-September 2010, a few weeks before the intended publication of this report, Congo’s 
ministry of mines issued a statement banning the mining, processing and marketing of minerals in 
Eastern DRC. Th is decision may have serious implications for the future of many of these initiatives, 
not to mention those tens of thousands of Congolese making a living from mining. For example, the 
iTSCi project has been suspended at the time of writing. 
6Both governmental and non-governmental organisations demand that international companies have 
strict due diligence processes in place when conducting business in weak governance zones, such as for 
example the DRC. Companies connected to trade in confl ict zones are increasingly expected to do 
their utmost in becoming aware of, preventing and mitigating human rights abuses. 
Th e EICC and GeSI set up an Extractives Workgroup in 2008. Th e Workgroup plans to start a smelter 
validation scheme starting with tantalum and tin ores in late 2010. Th e fi nal aim is to ensure that the 
material smelters purchase originate from socially and environmentally responsible mines. However, 
the current focus is on avoiding minerals from mines controlled by armed groups by ensuring the 
smelters show the exact origin of minerals. Th e Workgroup supports ITRI’s traceability project iTSCi 
and hopes that this project will make it possible for end users to purchase minerals from Eastern 
DRC. However, the industry confesses that there is a risk that the intention to stay away from ‘confl ict 
minerals’ means in practice an embargo on minerals from Eastern DRC, or even the whole region. 
Th is is also evidently what end users such as Sony Ericsson, Nokia and Hewlett-Packard are doing in 
practice for the moment. Research based NGOs and consultants voice strong warnings about this 
partly unintended embargo eff ect, which they see as a risk for the whole fragile economy in the region. 
In the fi eld interviews it was demonstrated that all members of civil society groups in Goma and 
Bukavu welcome the attempts of policymakers to ‘clean up’ the mining business in Eastern DRC. 
However, they want to have a stronger voice in the debate and more infl uence over initiatives that are 
currently taking shape. Most of the respondents rejected the idea of an embargo on minerals from 
Eastern DRC, while they expressed their concerns about the feasibility of traceability mechanisms, the 
lack of sensitization and organization of stakeholders at the grassroots level, and the lack of attention 
to social problems associated with the exploitation and trade in mineral resources. Th ese problems 
include land disputes, forced labour and sexual violence. 
Th ere is also a worry that international initiatives uncritically strengthen the Congolese state in a 
part of the country where trust in the state is very low due to years of corruption and state violence. 
Th e most important recommendations from local stakeholders are: education, capacity building and 
suffi  cient wages for civil servants involved in tracing and certifi cation projects; support to artisanal 
miners and people living around the mining areas; capacity building for traders and buying houses to 
adopt to new demands; and more attention to land rights, forced labour and sexual violence in mining 
areas.
Th e makeITfair project advises companies to apply a due diligence process, including tracing of 
minerals down to the mine from where they were extracted, and setting up systems to detect whether 
purchasing occurs from mines controlled by armed groups (including taxation by armed groups along 
the trading routes). For end users, this means monitoring the supply chain down to the smelters, 
and ensuring that smelters have control right down to the individual mine. If purchasing from mines 
‘controlled’ by armed groups (including FARDC) is detected, the company should have a strategy 
to respond to this. Th is strategy should depend on the nature and level of involvement from armed 
groups, human rights abuses etc., where some involvement should mean direct disengagement. 
However, action taken should include engaging proactively with local actors and working to make 
improvements, rather than boycotting the mine as a fi rst step. Ultimately, the involvement of either 
rebel groups or state army actors cannot be accepted. Purchasing of minerals should continuously 
increase from mines that respect and implement the basic standards of sustainable mining. 
71. INTRODUCTION 
Th e makeITfair project published a series of three reports in December 2007, including ‘Connecting 
Components, Dividing Communities – Tin production for consumer electronics in the DR 
Congo and Indonesia’. Th e report characterized the extractive industry as the ”forgotten level” 
of the consumer electronics supply chain, as well as shedding light on mining practices and their 
repercussions for workers and the environment in two tin mining countries. 
Th e consumer electronics industry utilises a signifi cant proportion of the global supply of several 
metals that are essential parts of mobile phones, computers and game consoles. Currently the 
electronics industry accounts for over one third of the world’s tin consumption – as solder. Apart 
from solder, tin is used in the LCD screens found in many electronic products. In recent years, the 
global tin market has been greatly aff ected by the increase in demand for lead-free solder in consumer 
electronics. Unlike other metals, the majority of the world’s tin is derived from small scale operations 
with susceptible social and environmental issues. 
In Eastern DRC a large majority of tin and other minerals are extracted by artisanal miners living 
and working in harsh conditions. Th e mines could be managed by landowners, local leaders or 
armed groups belonging either to the Congolese army or rebel groups. Th e armed groups may 
also be involved in taxing the mineral routes or giving “protection” from attacks by other armed 
groups. Th e actual mining is carried out by diggers working for daily wages. Th e local communities 
around the mining sites are employed as daily wage earners as diggers, helpers or carriers with some 
forced to work in the mines through for example debt bondage or coerced through violence. Many 
diff erent types of abuses against the workers and the local population around the mines are common. 
However, mining is an important livelihood for many people in the region. 
In 2007, the makeITfair project contacted the 20 market leaders producing consumer electronics. 
Th ese companies asserted that they are marginal users of metals in general, and that the extractive 
phase was beyond their sphere of infl uence. However, even if one gadget may need only a small 
quantity of these minerals, they are manufactured and sold in their billions worldwide, making 
the electronics industry a signifi cant user of metals like tin. Partly as a result of the makeITfair 
reports and roundtable meetings on the subject, most major electronics companies have accepted 
responsibility for the extractives phase of their supply chains. Th e industry associations EICC and 
GeSI have for example established a working group on extractives and have publically declared that 
they have a shared responsibility to address, in one way or another, urgent issues at the mine level. 
As the makeITfair project sees it, this responsibility covers a wide range of sustainability issues, such 
as working conditions of miners, respect for local populations around the mines and environmental 
degradation resulting from mineral extraction. 
One of the most serious sustainability issues is where minerals are extracted in confl ict areas such 
as Eastern DRC. Income from extraction of four minerals (tin-ore cassiterite, tantalum-ore coltan, 
wolframite and gold) is clearly part of the unoffi  cial economy that sustains the deadly confl ict. It was 
through the reports of the UN’s Expert Panel on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and 
Other Forms of Wealth of the DRC in 2001 that the world fi rst came to know about the connection 
between the war and the world trade in metals. Th ere have also been other armed confl icts in which 
natural resources have played a role and that have been documented by the UN (see e.g. Angola). 
8Recently, numerous eff orts and initiatives have 
focused on the link between confl ict and the 
mineral trade in Eastern DRC. 
Many of these initiatives aim to implement a 
certifi cation scheme for non-confl ict/sustainable 
minerals. Legislation designed to halt the import 
of so called confl ict minerals into the US passed 
in July 2010. Politicians in Sweden have started 
to ask for a similar law in Europe. At the same 
time, both international and local voices have been 
raised regarding the risk of further marginalisation 
of Congolese small-scale miners in this process. 
Th ere are also concerns that the growing public 
debate on ‘confl ict minerals’ will lead to corporate 
boycott strategies in practice on minerals from 
Eastern DRC. 
When high level institutions and industry are 
busy drawing up standards, local views and 
priorities are in danger of remaining unheard. Th is 
makeITfair report especially wants to channel the 
local voices of concerned people and civil society 
in Eastern DRC. Th e aim is to present the views 
and opinions of local stakeholders on recent 
developments in the mineral trade from Eastern 
DRC, as well as their views on international and 
local initiatives. 
In mid-September 2010, a few weeks before the 
intended publication of this report, Congo’s 
ministry of mines issued a statement banning the mining, processing and marketing of minerals in 
Eastern DRC. Th is decision may have serious implications for the future of many of these initiatives, 
not to mention the tens of thousands of Congolese making a living from mining. At the time of 
writing, however, the minister of mines in the DRC stated that the “ban will soon be over”. A short 
description of this new development, confl ict mineral clampdown, is in Chapter 6.
Th e makeITfair project focuses on how international electronic companies can support a regulated 
mineral trade that could contribute to economic and social development in Eastern DRC, rather 
than funding the belligerent parties. We see it as crucial that the views and suggestions of those 
most aff ected by mining in Eastern DRC are taken into account when corporate decisions on this 
pressing issue are taken. It is, however, important to note that eff orts regulating the mineral trade are 
not by any means the only initiatives needed to end violent confl ict in Eastern DRC. Much research 
supports the fact that the root cause of insecurity in Eastern DRC is not the confl ict mineral nexus, 
which means many security sector reforms need to be put in place to complement initiatives to break 
the circle of militarized mines and the mineral trade.1 
1 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region – A Policy Guide on Professionalisation, Formalisation and Increased 
Transparency, Resource Consulting Services (sponsored by the UK Dept. for International Development, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the London 
School of Economics) 
FACTS ABOUT THE DRC1
•  DRC is struggling to recover from Africa’s ‘’world 
war’’ in which an estimated three million people 
died between 1998 and 2003.
•  In a recent leaked report from the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, the 
Rwandan army, among others, is accused of 
having committed acts of genocide in Eastern 
DRC between 1993 and 2003. The report is 
expected to be offi cially published in October 
2010 despite opposition and threats from the 
Rwandan government.
•  The fi ve-year confl ict has pitted government 
forces, supported by Angola, Namibia and 
Zimbabwe, against rebels backed by Uganda 
and Rwanda. 
•  Despite a peace deal and the formation of a 
transitional government in 2003, people in the 
east of the country remain vulnerable and live in 
fear of rebel groups and the army.
•  Tens of thousands of women, possibly hundreds 
of thousands, have been raped since the 
beginning of the war. In just one month – August 
2010 – over 200 women were raped close to a 
mining area in North Kivu.
•  DRC hosts the UN’s largest peacekeeping 
mission (MONUC2).
1 BBC, Democratic Republic of Congo country profi le, http://news.bbc.
co.uk/2/hi/africa/counrty_profi les/1076399.stm#overview; New York 
Times (17 October 2008), Rape Victims’ Words Help Jolt Congo Into 
Change, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/18/world/africa/18congo.
html?_r=1; Friends of the Congo, Leaked UN Mapping Report on 
Crimes in the DRC”, http://friendsofthecongo.org/united-nations-report.
html
2 Called MONUSCO since June 2010
92. METHODOLOGY
On behalf of the makeITfair project, a Belgian non-governmental organisation called the 
International Peace Information Service (IPIS), contributed to parts of this report. IPIS is one of the 
organizations most experienced in undertaking reliable research concerning natural resource issues 
in Eastern DRC and has been researching the issue since 2001.2 In August 2009, IPIS published a 
map of mines in Eastern DRC, trying to show which mines are controlled by diff erent armed groups. 
Jeroen Cuvelier, a researcher at IPIS, conducted the fi eld study on behalf of the makeITfair-project. 
He has been working on the issue of resource exploitation in the DRC since 2001 as an affi  liate of 
IPIS and the Royal Museum for Central Africa in Tervuren.3 
Between 18 May and 1 July 2010, IPIS interviewed 21 representatives of relevant non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) in Goma and Bukavu (the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces) 
dealing with issues related to natural resource exploitation (see Annex 1). Th e selection of 
interviewees was made on the basis of organisations that were generally recognized as being strongly 
involved in the current debate on mining issues in North and South Kivu. In addition, IPIS 
conducted a few interviews with members of state institutions involved in the artisanal mining sector 
in Eastern DRC: SAESSCAM and the provincial mining division. Because of time constraints and 
the fact that miners are oft en not organised, IPIS did not, however, have the possibility to interview 
mine workers, who would have been eligible.
Th e information collected focused on the feasibility of newly developed initiatives and traceability 
mechanisms for more sustainable mineral production. Th e information also highlighted the embargo 
option and a possible ban on DRC-tin, the need for improved sensitization and organization of 
stakeholders at the grassroots level and the socio-cultural context in which mining takes place. Th e 
focus was on cassiterite (tin ore) mining and trade in the region. It is however important to stress that 
this report is not a complete overview of the local situation or of any single company. Th e views and 
opinions of local NGOs should be seen as indicators of general problems that need to be addressed. 
IPIS also compiled a short overview of the initiatives concerning mineral resource exploitation and 
confl ict fi nancing. Th is is presented as background in the next chapter of the report. In addition, 
Finnwatch and Swedwatch made a literary review and interviewed 12 representatives of companies 
and other organisations and researchers. Company representatives directly quoted in the report have 
had the opportunity to comment on the report before publication. Th e makeITfair project also 
asked EICC/GeSI for an offi  cial comment to this report. Th eir comments are available at the website 
www.makeitfair.org.  
Finnwatch and Swedwatch have chosen to focus on the production and trade of cassiterite (tin) 
however, it should be noted that most discussions in this report are also highly relevant for 
wolframite and tantalum (since these minerals are extracted in the same region or even from the 
same mines) and for the fourth confl ict mineral, gold, to a lesser degree, since gold carries an even 
bigger risk of smuggling and is partly extracted in other areas.
2 For more information: http://www.ipisresearch.be/index.php 
3 http://www.ipisresearch.be/staff_detail.php?id=23&lang=en, accessed 1 September 2010
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3. WHAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE 2007? 
3.1 DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MINING SECTOR IN EASTERN DRC
According to the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index (HDI) 
2009, the DRC is the world’s seventh least developed country.4 Despite reunifi cation of the country, 
much of the eastern part remains unstable and violent. At the same time the DRC is a land plentiful 
in natural resources. According to the British Geological Survey, the DRC’s production of tin was 
about 12,000 tonnes in 2009 which is 4.3 percent of total world production.5 According to other 
sources, in early 2010 cassiterite (tin ore) from the DRC represented around 6 percent of global 
production with around half of that originating in North Kivu.6 However, it is diffi  cult to obtain real 
production fi gures when it comes to the DRC since there is a large informal sector and a signifi cant 
proportion of minerals are smuggled out without registration.    
Th e mining business in Eastern DRC cannot 
be adequately understood without taking into 
account the inherently regional nature of the 
mineral trade in this part of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Before reaching their fi nal destination, minerals 
extracted from North and South Kivu and other 
Congolese provinces need to pass through one 
of the countries neighbouring the DRC such 
as Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania. 
Th erefore, many international mineral buyers 
use the hubs of Kigali, Bujumbura, Kampala and 
Dar-es-Salaam to conclude and coordinate their 
mineral deals, which makes it even harder to trace 
the metals.7
Th e mining industry in the Great Lakes region 
is currently struggling with two major problems. 
Th e fi rst problem concerns the phenomenon of 
so-called ‘confl ict minerals’. Authorities in the 
DRC and in neighbouring countries experience 
serious diffi  culties monitoring mineral fl ows in the 
area, while they are largely incapable of preventing 
state and non-state armed groups from gaining 
revenues through mining and mining-related 
activities. Th e second problem is the collection of 
tax revenues. Most countries in the Great Lakes 
region lack the capacity to levy taxes in an eff ective 
and effi  cient manner.8 As a result of this, they miss 
4 http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/
5 British Geological Survey (2010), World Mineral Production 2004–2008, p. 98 
6 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 32
7 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 11
8 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Un système de suivi et de certifi cation des minéraux de la région des Grands Lacs de l’Afrique Centrale, 
hébergé par la CIRGL, Ottawa, March 2010, p. 2.
WORKING CONDITIONS AMONG 
ARTISANAL MINERS IN EESTERN DRC1
•  Most Congolese artisanal miners earns between 
US$ 1–3 per day irrespective of whether they 
mine diamonds, gold, copper, coltan, cobalt or 
cassiterite. 
•  The UN noted that around 75 percent of artisanal 
miners were unable to cover minimum family 
needs with their earnings. 
•  Most miners become trapped, either through 
debt bondage, or because they have travelled far 
and abandoned their homes and farms and have 
no way of returning to their previous livelihoods.
•  Artisanal mining in the DRC encompasses a 
range of typically dangerous practices such 
as unstable open pits, poorly supported or 
unsupported deep shafts and galleries where 
diggers may remain underground for days.
•  Child labour and debt-bondage exist in the 
mines.
•  The labour conditions of virtually all artisanal 
mines in the DRC are appalling and miners 
are generally completely unaware of basic 
occupational health and safety. Injuries and fatal 
accidents caused by shafts collapsing often 
occur.
1 D’Souza, Kevin (2007), Artisanal Mining in the DRC, Briefi ng note 
(prepared for discussion at the DRC Donor Coordination Meeting), 
Wardell Armstrong, LLP, p. 4; FinnWatch/makeITfair (2007),Con-
necting Components, Dividing Communities – Tin production for 
consumer electronics in the DR Congo and Indonesia
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out on a signifi cant amount 
of money that could be 
used to improve the well-
being of their populations.
Th ere are, however, signs 
of better controlled and 
legally taxed mineral fl ows 
from Eastern DRC. Today, 
registered cassiterite and 
coltan exports are close to known mining 
capacity and fraudulent exports are a 
fraction of what they were, according 
to a recent report from the Pole 
Institute.9 Th e Pole Institute, 
based in Goma, DRC, has 
considerable experience in research 
and consultation regarding peace, 
development and trade in natural 
resources in the Eastern DRC region.10 
Also the Trading for Peace programme, 
initiated by among others the UK 
Department for International Development 
(DFID) and USAID, reports that there have 
been some positive developments when it comes to 
building cross-border networking and support for small scale traders 
that it believes can support peaceful development.11
Large amounts of cassiterite from the DRC still originate from the 
province of North Kivu, in an area named Walikale, where the richest 
tin mine is Bisie. Bisie employs approximately 2,000 artisanal miners and their 10,000 dependents.12 
Th e makeITfair report from 2007 described the power struggles and corruption around Bisie. It also 
looked at the working conditions of artisanal miners, as well as the buying houses and international 
traders involved, and export routes and destinations of these traders. In 2007, Bisie was under 
the control of a renegade brigade of the national army (FARDC) that had allegedly committed 
many crimes against humanity. Since early 2009, the FARDC’s fi rst regular brigade, dominated by 
ex-CNDP13 soldiers, has been controlling the mine.14 In a newly published report from the Pole 
Institute, the author Primo Pascal Rudahigwa writes about his experiences at the Bisie mine which 
confi rms the picture of a lawless land with several diff erent fractions of the army and diff erent 
soldiers profi ting from mining activities.15
9 Johnson, Dominic (August 2010), Who’s in charge? – Putting the Mineral Trade in Eastern DRC under International Control: An Overview, Pole Institute, p. 21
10 For more information: http://www.pole-institute.org/ 
11 DFID (March 2009), Trading for Peace – An Agenda of Reform
12 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 32 
13 The CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) was a political armed militia established by Laurent Nkunda in the Kivu region of the DRC in 2006. The 
CNDP was engaged in the Kivu confl ict. In January 2009, the CNDP split and Nkunda was arrested by his ostensible-Rwanda backers. The remaining CNDP 
splinter faction was integrated into the national army FARDC. According to IPIS, after its integration into the FARDC, the (ex-)CNDP access to the mines has clearly 
increased. The (ex-)CNDP soldiers have installed of taxation in the mining centres they control. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Congress_for_the_Defen-
ce_of_the_People; Spittaels, S. & Hilgert, F. (August 2009), Accompanying note on the interactive map of militarised mining areas in the Kivus, IPIS, p. 3, 11
14 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 10 
15 Pole Institute (August 2010), Blood Minerals – The Criminalization of the Mining Industry in Eastern DRC, p. 12–16
Source: UN OCHA
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Th e UN Group of Experts on the DRC has released several reports documenting in detail how 
businesses, armed rebel groups and government actors are involved in the mineral trade.16 Several 
countries are currently involved in initiatives to end the link between the mineral trade and the 
confl ict in Eastern DRC. In the US, a law requiring disclosure of any minerals originating from 
the DRC and adjoining countries has already been passed and other legislation is in the pipeline. 
Th e German government is working with the Congolese Ministry of Mines to set up a certifi cation 
scheme, while the British and Dutch governments are examining how to support customs 
harmonization between the DRC, Burundi and Rwanda to reduce smuggling across the borders. 
DFID, USAID and the organization for regional trade in Southern and Eastern Africa, COMESA, 
have worked since 2006 on a common programme called Trading for Peace which supports regional 
economic integration. Th e International Conference for Peace, Security, Stability and Development 
in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) plans to set up a certifi cation scheme for minerals from the 
region. Th ese initiatives have focused on three ways of dealing with the problem: due diligence, 
certifi cation and reinforcing local institutions.17 In a recent report from Resource Consulting Services 
the authors call for better coordination and consolidation of some of these eff orts and initiatives in 
order to make them more viable and eff ective.18 
3.2 CURRENT EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES TO REFORM THE CONGOLESE MINING SECTOR
Faced with demands from consumers, NGOs and some countries, including proposals for legislation, 
the electronics industry recently started to consider traceability in their mineral supply chains and 
the issue of avoiding fuelling the confl ict in Eastern DRC. Th e eff orts highlighted here represent 
some of the leading initiatives from both the industry, organisations and state actors in the area, even 
though the list is not exhaustive.
Due diligence processes by companies and business associations
In order to avoid the risk of companies becoming complicit in human rights abuses, the concept 
of due diligence has gained widespread support in recent years. Both governmental and non-
governmental organisations are now increasingly demanding that international companies have 
16 The reports can be downloaded at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml 
17 Hege, S. & Stearns, J. (January 2010), Independent Oversight for Mining in the Eastern DR Congo – A Proposal for a Third Party Monitoring & Enforcement 
Mechanism, Center on International Cooperation concept note, http://www.cic.nyu.edu/peace_ssr/docs/oversight_mechanism.pdf 
18 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 17
Tin supply chain from the Bisie mine in Eastern DR Congo to global electronic manufacturers.
Bisie mine, Walikale, 
North Kivu, DRC
Local traders, 
Njingala,
North Kivu, DRC 
International marketing
fi rms, Goma,
North Kivu, DRC 
Big smelters in 
Malaysia, 
(Thailand), India and 
perhaps in China
Solder producers and
global electronic 
manufacturers
Cassiterite (tin ore) 
carried by foot 45 km
to the nearest village
Njingala
Cassiterite fl own by 
plane from Walikale to 
the provincial capital 
Goma
Cassiterite transported
to the ports of Kenya
and Tanzania, then 
shipped to Asia
Cassiterite refi ned into
tin metal or solder 
and sold to the global 
solder and electronics 
industry 
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strict due diligence processes in place when 
conducting business in weak governance zones, 
such as the DRC.19 
Th e juddical defi nition of due diligence is the 
process a person or a company goes through 
to satisfy a legal requirement or to discharge 
an obligation. Th e Special Representative of 
the UN Secretary-General on Human Rights 
and Transnational Corporations, John Ruggie, 
uses this term in its broader sense; according 
to him due diligence is “a comprehensive, 
proactive attempt to uncover human rights 
risks, actual and potential, over the entire life 
cycle of a project or business activity, with the 
aim of avoiding and mitigating those risks.”20 
Th e concept of due diligence is similar to the principle of ‘Do no harm’ which is used within the 
humanitarian community to avoid complicity with human rights abuses in confl ict regions or weak 
governance zones.21
Th e most recent and detailed guidance for companies on how to implement due diligence processes 
when sourcing minerals from confl ict zones in Eastern DRC comes from an international NGO 
focusing on investigations and campaigning concerning trade in natural resources, Global Witness22, 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Both organisations 
make a distinction between the roles and due diligence requirements of a) companies handling, 
trading and processing raw mineral concentrate and b) those using refi ned metals.23
According to Global Witness, applying due diligence means that companies make sure they do 
not source from mines where military involvement is evident. Companies such as smelters should 
perform quarterly unannounced audits at mines, while downstream companies such as electronic 
manufacturers should verify “through a rigorous assessment” that the claims about the sources and 
any military involvement made by their suppliers are correct. Global Witness recommends that each 
smelter is assessed once a year24 and that all audits are made publicly available.25 OECD set up a pilot 
project ‘Promoting Responsible Investment through Enhanced Due Diligence’ 26 in 2009 with the aim of 
presenting practical guidelines for companies on how to implement due diligence when sourcing in 
confl ict zones.27 Th e guidance includes the following steps: (1) establish a chain of custody tracking 
system over the mineral supply chain, (2) identify and assess risks in the supply chain, (3) design 
19 See the portal of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General on Business & Human Rights, John Ruggie, http://www.business-humanrights.
org/SpecialRepPortal/Home; and OECD pilot project in the mining sector: promoting responsible investment through enhanced due diligence, http://www.oecd.org/
document/36/0,3343,en_2649_34889_44307940_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 19 April 2010
20 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council (22 April 2009), Promotion of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including the 
Right to Development, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises, Summary, p. 18, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf 
21 See for example OECD (2010), Do No harm – International Support for State Building, http://www.oecd.org/docu-
ment/30/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_44408734_1_1_1_1,00.html
22 For more information: http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/about_us.html 
23 Global Witness (July 2010), A Guide for Companies: Do No Harm – Excluding confl ict minerals from the supply chain; and OECD (June 2010), Due Diligence 
Guidance for responsible supply chain management of minerals from confl ict-affected and high-risk areas, working draft, p 5. (copy available from the author) 
24 Global Witness is part of a multi-stakeholder group that gives input to EICC/GeSI’s Extractive Workgroup’s audit standards for their smelter validation scheme, 
25 Global Witness (July 2010), A Guide for Companies: Do No Harm – Excluding confl ict minerals from the supply chain, p. 9–13; Mike Davies, Global Witness, inter-
view on 23 April 2010.
26 Promoting responsible investment in the mining sector through enhanced due diligence, OECD project overview 
27 Dr Lahra Liberti, Adviser on International Investment Law, Investment Division, OECD, e-mail interview on 10 May 2010
DEFINITION OF TRACING AND TRACKING
Tracing and tracking of materials through the supply 
chain both refer to the process of identifi cation of 
metals from user to source. 
The difference is that “tracking” refers to the process 
of following material forward along the supply chain, 
following the fl ow “downstream,” for example from 
mine to smelter and down to the manufacturer. 
“Tracing” refers to an examination of the fl ow 
backwards, or “upstream,” through the supply chain 
to determine the sources and processors of the 
material.
Source: EICC/GeSI (2008), Social and Environmental Responsibility in Metals 
Supply to the Electronic Industry, p. 33
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and implement a strategy to respond to identifi ed risks, (4) ensure independent third party audits of 
smelters’ due diligence practices and (5) publish an annual report on supply chain due diligence.28
In other words, companies connected to trade in confl ict zones are increasingly expected to do their 
utmost to be aware of, prevent and mitigate any involvement in human rights abuses through strict 
processes.
Th e electronics industry’s eff orts: EICC/GeSI Extractive Workgroup
Th e electronics industry has worked on the issue mainly within its two associations focused on 
sustainability and responsible electronics manufacturing: Th e Electronic Industry Citizenship 
Coalition (EICC) and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI). Th ey set up an Extractives 
Workgroup in 2008.29 In April 2010, in an eff ort to improve traceability, the Washington-based 
research institute Resolve published a report – commissioned by EICC and GeSI – in which it 
presented data on the supply chains for electronic products containing tin, tantalum and cobalt.30 
Resolve, among others, recommended a sector-wide approach and pilot projects on best practice on 
the ground in Eastern DRC. Th e Workgroup decided to start a smelter validation scheme starting 
with tantalum and tin ores to ensure materials that the smelters purchase originate from non-confl ict 
mines. It is expected that initial audits will begin in late 2010. “In short, the smelters need to show us 
where all the minerals come from and we need to be able to verify it with audits,” said John L. Plyler, 
Manager Supply Chain Corporate Responsibility, from Motorola.31 EICC/GeSI has also decided 
to support and work closely with the iTSCi, ITRI’s tracing project in Eastern DRC (see further 
information below).32 Th e standard for the smelter validation scheme is still not publicly available. A 
request from the makeITfair project to take part in draft ing the scheme has so far not been accepted.
ITRI’s Tin Supply Chain Initiative
Faced with criticism from the UN Panel of Experts33 and from several international NGOs working 
on natural resource issues34 and confl ict, the tin industry association ITRI decided to develop a due 
diligence mechanism for tin originating from Eastern DRC, labelled the ITRI Tin Supply Chain 
Initiative (iTSCi). Th e fi rst pilot phase in 2009 focused on the interface between Congolese trading 
posts (comptoir) and foreign smelters. Th e second pilot phase aims to improve traceability from the 
mine to the buying houses. It is ITRI’s intention to work closely together with Congolese institutions 
such as the provincial mining division and SAESSCAM.35 In June 2010, ITRI announced that it 
had signed a ‘protocole d’accord’ with the Congolese Ministry of Mines and selected two mine sites 
for the initial trials, namely Bisie in North Kivu and Nyabibwe in South Kivu (see below for more 
information about these mine sites). Th e American international development organisation Pact was 
charged with the task of providing strategic and technical advice to ITRI and their local partners.36 
Pact is as an NGO working with capacity building projects particularly related to artisanal mining 
28 OECD (June 2010), Due Diligence Guidance for responsible supply chain management of minerals from confl ict-affected and high-risk areas, working draft, p 5. 
(copy available with the author) 
29 EICC Annual Report 2009, http://eicc.info/documents/AnnualReport.pdf, p. 21
30 Resolve (April 2010), Tracing a Path Forward: A Study of the Challenges of the Supply Chain for Target Metals Used in Electronics, http://eicc-gesi.resolv.wikispaces.
net/Tracing+a+Path+Forward+-+A+Study+of+the+Challenges+of+the+Supply+Chain+for+Target+Metals+Used+in+Electronics?f=print
31 John L Plyler, Manager Supply Chain Corporate Responsibility, Motorola, interview on 13 May 2010
32 EICC Press release (28 May 2010), http://www.eicc.info/pdf/PR%20Extractives%20Sn%20Workshop%20I%20FINAL.2.pdf
33 S/2008/773 Final Report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of Congo
34 Global Witness (June 2005), Under-mining peace: the explosive trade in cassiterite in Eastern DRC; Global Witness (July 2009), Faced with a gun what can you 
do? War and the militarisation of mining in Eastern Congo; International Peace Information Service IPIS (May 2009), Culprits or scapegoats? Revisiting the role of 
Belgian mineral traders in Eastern DRC; De Koning, Ruben (October 2009), Artisanal mining and post-confl ict reconstruction in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
SIPRI background paper; The Enough Project (January 2010), Digging in: recent developments on confl ict minerals 
35 DRC Tin supply chain initiative, ITRI press release, 10 July 2009
36 DRC Ministry of Mines reconfi rms offi cial support, ITRI press release, 11 June 2010 
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around the world. As a result of the recent legislation in the US, Karen Hayes, Pact’s Director of 
Corporate Community Engagement for Africa writes that Pact now has “a greater management 
role in order to help to accelerate and expand the iTSCi-project”. Pact takes a pragmatic approach 
to its development programmes; Hayes writes that Pact’s role is to fi nd appropriate local solutions 
that can improve the lives of Congolese people, and that this means having room for fl exibility. So 
far the pilot project is focusing on putting in place appropriate traceability mechanisms and ITRI 
has not yet set up any standards for “non-confl ict” mines. At this point, the only mines in which the 
iTSCi-project will not implement the traceability system are those which are under ‘rebel control’. 
Karen Hayes argues that forcing dramatic change in a short time can be a highly risky activity. “In our 
opinion, the objective of a project like this should be to establish a baseline on the social-economic-
security issues, engage all the relevant partners, and collectively and progressively work towards 
improving the situation without creating security risks.”37 
Th e selection of Bisie and Nyabibwe mines is quite controversial. At both mines the national army 
FARDC is present, and the human rights situation at both sites is highly questionable according to 
many sources.38 Global Witness has been critical of ITRI for its acceptance of army controlled mines, 
which they regard as bad as the rebel groups when it comes to human rights violations. Dominic 
Johnson from the Pole Institute said “defi nitely FARDC is no more acceptable than FDLR or 
anyone else, because the boundaries between FARDC and rebel groups are fl uid and fi ghters move 
in and out of FARDC”. According to him FARDC is in no sense a proper army, and even if it was: 
“nowhere in the world is a military presence in mines acceptable”.39 A UN report in March 2010 
reported the continued presence of serious violations by the security forces. Members of the FARDC 
37 Karen Hayes, Director of Corporate Community Engagement for the Africa Region, Pact, interview on 20 August 2010
38 See for example Pole Institute (August 2010), Blood minerals – The Criminalization of the Mining Industry in Eastern DRC (recent information on Bisie) and for 
Nyabibwe; IPIS Congolese research assistant from Action pour la Paix et la Concorde (APC) in Bukavu recently visited the mine site and interviewed people for Inter-
national Alert, published in a coming report
39 Dominic Johnson, the Pole Institute, e-mail on 7 June 2010
Artisanal cassiterite mining in Bisie, Walikale area, in North Kivu. © Nicholas Garrett
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and the police were reported as being responsible for summary executions, sexual violence, torture 
and ill treatment. Many of the FARDC troops used to be members of rebel groups prior to being 
integrated into the army.40
Hayes notes that the selection of Nyabibwe and Bisie was based on the basic premise of ‘no rebel 
control’ and says that other criteria will be added later. Both Nyabibwe and Bisie represent big 
production units with many opportunities to learn from the fi rst phase of the process.41
(Note that at the time of writing the iTSCi-project is suspended due to the sudden Congolese ban on 
mining in Eastern DRC, see Chapter 6 for more information).
Initiatives by countries and international organizations
Certifi ed Trading Chains
ITRI/iTSCi traceability project has agreed to work with the BGR (German Federal Institute for 
Geosciences and Natural Resources) certifi cation project.42 Within the framework of development 
cooperation between Germany and the DRC, eff orts have been made to create a new system for 
the recording and certifi cation of the origin of minerals (mainly tantalum). Th e system is called 
‘Certifi ed Trading Chains’ (CTCs)43 and has been developed by the BGR and several departments of 
the Congolese Ministry of Mines, including SAESSCAM. Phase 1 of the project is expected to run 
over a three-year period – from the beginning of 2009 until the end of 2012 – and it has a budget of 
€3.2 million44. In the opinion of its designers, the CTC system has the potential to play a vital role in 
rendering the mining industry more transparent and accountable, and in ensuring that the Congolese 
state uses its revenues from the mining business to improve the socio-economic situation and to 
reduce the level of poverty in Eastern DRC.45 BGR will cooperate with the iTCSi-project especially 
in the fi eld at Nyabibwe. Both BGR and ITRI are members of the Ministry of Mines Th ematic 
Working Group which aims to coordinate all initiatives concerning developing the mining sector in 
the DRC.46
Th e International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)
Th e International Conference For Peace, Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR) came into existence in November 2004, when 11 heads of state and government 
of the Great Lakes region met to talk about ways to put an end to the many wars and confl icts in the 
region. In 2006, the ICGLR launched a ‘Regional Initiative Against Illegal Exploitation of Natural 
Resources’.47 In April 2010, the ICGLR’s steering committee of the initiative gathered in Bujumbura 
to discuss further steps in the ‘cleaning up’ of the mineral trade in the Great Lakes region. An 
agreement was reached on a draft  proposal that will oblige all participating countries to certify the 
40 UN General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Technical assistance and capacity-building (8 March 2010), Second joint report of seven United Nations experts on 
the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 13th session, Agenda item 10, A/HRC/13/63
41 Karen Hayes, Director of Corporate Community Engagement for the Africa Region, Pact, interview on 20 August 2010
42 iTSCi News Bulletin 4, June 2010
43 BGR serves as the geological service of the German Federal Government. Amongst other things, it is expected to carry out projects of technical cooperation on 
behalf of the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development. BGR is currently operating in nine African countries, including the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (source: Atelier de planifi cation du projet BGR-MDM: certifi cation des substances minérales (March 2010), Bukavu, p. 8 
44 Atelier de planifi cation du projet BGR-MDM: certifi cation des substances minérales (March 2010), Bukavu 
45 Pole Institute (August 2010), Blood Minerals – The Criminalization of the Mining Industry in Eastern DRC
46 DRC Ministry of Mines reconfi rms offi cial support, ITRI press release, 11 June 2010, http://www.itri.co.uk/pooled/articles/BF_NEWSART/view.asp?Q=BF_NEW-
SART_319685
47 ICGLR (September 2006), Regional Programme of Action for the Promotion of Democracy and Good Governance
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origin of minerals extracted within their territories.48 Th e four main components of the ICGLR 
Mineral Tracking and Certifi cation Scheme are mineral tracking, the establishment of a regional 
database, the organization of regular third party audits and the nomination of an overall auditor-
general.49 Th e ICGLR process works in close cooperation with the above mentioned OECD’s 
guidance for due diligence.50 So far there is no formal cooperation with the iTSCi and BGR’s 
projects; however, it is requested by many actors with more coordination between all international 
initiatives going on.51 
UN sanctions and interventions
According to resolution 1896 (2009), the UN Group of Experts is now entitled to formulate 
recommendations about due diligence procedures to be followed by all importers, processing 
industries and consumers dealing with mineral products from Eastern DRC.52 For this work, 
OECDs project on due diligence is timely and OECD will report their fi ndings to the Group of 
Experts.53 Following the adoption of resolution 1906 (2009) on 23 December 2009, MONUC54 
is expected to exchange information with the Group of Experts about the illegal traffi  cking of 
natural resources from the DRC. When the mandate of the UN mission in the DRC was extended 
on 28 May 2010 – an extension that was coupled with the transformation of MONUC into 
MONUSCO55 – it was clear that the issue of mineral exploitation in Eastern DRC would remain 
high on the agenda.56 
Th e Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Th e aim of the EITI, established by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2002, is to promote 
the disclosure of revenues generated by the natural resource sector and to encourage transparency 
with regard to revenue received by government bodies. Although the DRC expressed its willingness 
to join the EITI already in 2008 (it was accepted as an EITI candidate country on 22 February 
2008) it has not yet obtained its membership, mostly due to the troublesome situation in country at 
the political and security level.57 Th e DRC had until 9 September 2010 to submit a fi nal validation 
report to the EITI Board.
Foreign legislative measures
In July 2010 the US Senate passed the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act which includes a section on Congolese “confl ict minerals”.58 Th e aim of the law is to put an end 
to the import of minerals (tin, tantalum, wolframite and gold) originating from Congolese confl ict 
areas by companies established on US territory.59 Th e law requires US companies to submit an annual 
report to the Securities and Exchange Commission disclosing if their products contain these four 
48 Business for Social Responsibility (May 2010), Confl ict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo:
 Supply Chain, Government and Capacity Building – An Overview for Participants in the DRC Confl ict Minerals Forum, available at http://pactworld.org/galleries/
default-fi le/Confl ict%20Minerals%20Forum%20Issue%20Overview.pdf 
49 Blore, S. & Smillie, I. (April 2010), An ICGLR-based tracking and certifi cation system for minerals from the great lakes region, Partnership Africa Canada – working 
document of the ICGLR (copy available with the author) 
50 A joint OECD-ICGLR conference in Nairobi, Kenya, 29–30 September 2010
51 See for example conclusions in Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services
52 Resolution 1896 (2009), Adopted by the Security Council at its 6225th meeting, on 30 November 2009, p. 3, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/
cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27–4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/DRC%20S%20RES%201896.pdf 
53 OECD, http://www.oecd.org/document/36/0,3343,en_2649_34889_44307940_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed 2 September 2010
54 MONUC (Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) is the UN force in the DRC
55 MONUSCO (United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) has a mandate to work for stabilization in foremost the 
Eastern DRC up to 30th of June 2011. UN Resolution 1925 (2010) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6324th meeting (28 May 2010), http://www.un.org/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1925%282010%29 
56 Spittales, Steven (June 2010), MONUC’s / MONUSCO’s role in Eastern DRC in regards to the demilitarization and securing of mining zones, (unpublished commis-
sioned IPIS report), p. 4 
57 Information from the EITI website (http://eiti.org), accessed 8 June 2010
58 The full text of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act“ is published by the US Government on http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf, accessed 11 August 2010
59 Information from the website of US Congress (www.opencongress.org/bill/111-h4128/show), accessed 27 April 2010
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metals from the DRC or adjacent countries. If they do, they are prescribed to report what measures 
they are taking to trace the minerals’ origin and exercise due diligence on the source. Th e law does 
not impose any penalty on companies who report taking no action. But the disclosures must be made 
publicly.60 Th e US Secretary of State is entitled to develop a confl ict map to “address the linkages 
between human right abuses, armed groups, mining of confl ict minerals, and commercial products”, 
including guidance on how to ensure that minerals are not directly or indirectly fi nancing armed 
groups.61 
Th e US legislation has been met with divided reactions, which are described in more detail in the 
next chapters. Many fear that the law will lead to exclusion of mineral mining and trade from a large 
region in Africa and point to the fact that it is today very diffi  cult to prove that non-confl ict minerals 
have come from Eastern DRC. Th e law has got support, in addition to some NGOs62, from Margot 
Wallström, the UN’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Confl icts, as well as several 
Swedish political parties which expressed their intention to work for similar legislation in the EU.63
Capacity building of the Congolese state 
STAREC
Th e STAREC64 plan is the Congolese state’s stabilisation programme. Th e plan is due to be 
implemented in several areas in Eastern DRC and has three components: a security component, 
a humanitarian and social component, and an economic component. Th e restoration of state 
authority over the timber and minerals sectors is considered an objective associated with the security 
component. Th e aim is to have offi  cial Congolese security forces exercise permanent supervision over 
mining sites exploited by armed groups, to deploy a number of state agencies at the provincial level65 
and to set up checkpoints in the vicinity of airstrips and roads leading to mining areas.66 
Th e creation of trading centres
Together with the UN force MONUSCO, the Congolese government has devised a plan to create 
fi ve trading centres (centres de négoce) in North and South Kivu.67 Th e creation of the trading centres 
fi ts in with the STAREC plan, as it would contribute to the restoration of the authority of the state 
in Eastern DRC. MONUSO or local police offi  cers will protect the sites where the centres will 
be located, and the UN Offi  ce for Project Services (UNOPS) will rehabilitate roads in order to 
facilitate access to the sites.68 Th e idea is also that the trading centres will lead to less smuggling and 
enable local people to benefi t more from the extraction of minerals.
60 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Sec. 1502, p. 851; Washington Post (21 July 2010), U.S. fi nancial reform bill also targets ‘confl ict 
minerals’ from Congo
61 Ibid., p. 853
62 The American legislation has got support from international NGOs such as World Vision and Global Witness as well as American NGOs such as Enough 
63 Dagens Nyheter (3 August 2010), Sverige och EU måste agera, http://www.dn.se/debatt/sverige-och-eu-maste-agera-1.1147499, Dagens Nyheter (5 August 2010), 
Vi vill lagstifta mot konfl iktmineraler, http://www.dn.se/debatt/vi-vill-lagstifta-mot-konfl iktmineraler-1.1148845
64 Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des Zones sortant des confl its armés, can be translated as Programme for the Stabilization and Reconstruction of 
zones coming out of armed confl ict. Its total cost is estimated at approximately US$ 1.204 million
65 These state agencies include the mining registry, the CEEC, and the anti-fraud service of the Ministry of Mines (source: Custers, Raf (August 2009), Het STAREC-
plan van de Congolese regering: een voorlopige analyse, IPIS)
66 Custers, Raf (August 2009), Het STAREC-plan van de Congolese regering: een voorlopige analyse, IPIS
67 Le Potentiel (18 February 2010), La guerre du controle des puits miniers a commence 
68 MONUC to support the Congolese government’s efforts for the regulation of the mineral trade’, MONUC press release, 17 February 2010 
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PROMINES
Th e World Bank has started a technical assistance project called PROMINES, which is going to 
be led and driven by the Congolese Ministry of Mines.69 Co-funded by the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID), PROMINES’ aim is to strengthen the capacity of Congolese 
state institutions involved in the mining sector so that they become capable of managing the mining 
business in a more responsible and transparent manner.70 In July 2010, the World Bank announced 
the approval of a US$ 50 million grant for PROMINES.71 A central aim of the project is helping 
the DRC move towards compliance with the enhanced Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
(EITI).
Th e Ministry of Mines Th ematic Working Group
In order to steer things in the right direction, the Congolese government has decided to create a so-
called Th ematic Working Group, which is led by the Congolese Ministry of Mines. Th e Th ematic 
Working Group has been charged with the coordination and harmonization of a wide variety of 
measures, such as ITRI’s and BGR’s projects, aimed at ‘cleaning up’ the mining sector.72 Th is shows 
that the Congolese state sees the need for greater coordination of diff erent initiatives. 
A common feature of most of the eff orts and initiatives is that they have originated internationally, 
and oft en only in dialogue with the central authorities in the DRC. During the summer of 2010 
the makeITfair project and its partners therefore asked local stakeholders for their views, described 
below. 
3.3 LOCAL VIEWS AND OPINIONS: DOUBTS ABOUT THE FEASIBILITY OF TRACEABILITY 
MECHANISMS
A topic that frequently popped up during the interviews carried out for the makeITfair project 
by IPIS in Goma and Bukavu was the feasibility of putting in place a well-functioning traceability 
mechanism. Many interviewees doubted whether Congolese civil servants had enough expertise, 
equipment, authority and integrity to play a positive role in the newly developed initiatives to render 
the mining business more transparent. 
Aloys Tegera, the head of the research-based Pole Institute in Goma, expressed his concern about 
the continuing weakness of Congolese state institutions in the mining sector. He argued that the 
strengthening of these institutions is a precondition for claiming any area ‘confl ict free’. For example, 
he mentioned that transport routes between mining areas and trading centres would most probably 
not receive enough protection from the Congolese state and from MONUSCO. Th at would mean 
that it would still be possible for armed groups to levy illegal taxes, attack those transporting minerals 
and mix minerals from diff erent mines in order to conceal their exact origin.73 
Delly Mawazo Sesete, the Director-General of the human rights organisation Creddho (Centre de 
Recherche sur l’Environnement, la Démocratie et les Droits Humains), pointed out the diffi  culties 
69 Information from Rachel Perks (Pact) to Jeroen Cuvelier (IPIS), 21 June 2010
70 Information from the Pact website (http://pactworld.org), accessed 8 June 2010 
71 World Bank approves a grant of US$50 million for growth with governance in the mineral sector project (PROMINES) in the DRC, World Bank press release, 1 July 
2010
72 La Prospérité (27 May 2010), Martin Kabwelulu évalue les travaux du Groupe Thématique
73 Still, Tegera was glad that economic operators had fi nally understood that, if they wanted their business activities to continue, it was absolutely necessary for them 
to support international initiatives aimed at cleaning up the mining sector. In his view, the most positive effect of the debate on traceability mechanisms was that 
all stakeholders (with the exception of non-state armed groups) were fi nally prepared to sit together around the same table in order to talk. about solutions for the 
problem of confl ict minerals, interview in Goma, 21 May 2010
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associated with demilitarizing the mines. In his view the Congolese government’s statements about 
the demilitarization of mining areas in Eastern DRC are just a form of window dressing. In order 
to make his point, he cited the example of the Bisie mine, situated in the territory of Walikale in 
North Kivu (see above). According to a research report that was published by Creddho in September 
2009, Bisie witnessed the visit of a high profi le delegation on 7 August 2009. Th e delegation was 
composed of the Congolese Prime Minister, the National Minister of Mines, the Commander of 
the 8th Military Region, the Joint Military Commander and several other senior offi  cials.74 Th e 
offi  cial aim of the visit was to announce the decision of President Joseph Kabila that all members 
of the FARDC had to pull out of mines in the region.75 However, on 12 August 2009, just fi ve days 
aft er this announcement, there was an attack led by a trader with links to the Mai Mai rebel group76 
and FDLR77 on Bisie, which left  several people dead and several others wounded. According to 
the authors of the Creddho research report, the timing of this attack was not a coincidence. Th ey 
claimed that the raid on Bisie was the result of a conspiracy between certain military offi  cials in 
FARDC and leaders of the FDLR. In their view, it was plausible that the former had asked the latter 
to attack Bisie so that the former could justify the continued presence of the military at the mine.78 
Saidi Kubuya, the spokesman for Assodip, an organization that deals with sustainable development 
and human rights in North Kivu, shared the concerns of Aloys Tegera and Delly Mawazo Sesete with 
regard to the poor performance of public servants in the mining sector in Eastern DRC. According 
to Kubuya, there were four reasons to be sceptical about the chances of success of MONUC’s ‘centres 
de négoce’: the distance between the mining sites and the trading centres; the lack of appropriate 
security measures on the road between the mines and the trading centres; the lack of governmental 
control in the mines themselves79; and the continuing presence of military actors in the mining areas. 
Kubuya argued that, since the mining areas had not yet been demilitarized, there is still a risk that 
members of the FARDC would continue to harass transporters of minerals on their way from the 
mine to the trading centres. 
In Kubuya’s view, policy makers had made a mistake in assuming that the problem of confl ict 
minerals could be solved by building highly protected mineral trading centres in the immediate 
vicinity of what were known to be the most important mines (in terms of production and number of 
miners). He pointed out that mines could be very popular at one point in time, but that they could 
also lose that popularity shortly aft erwards. In addition to this, Kubuya argued that artisanal miners 
were very mobile so that, sooner or later, they would migrate to mines further away from the centres 
de négoce. Th e greater the distance between the mines and the centres de négoce, Kubuya said, the 
more problems the Congolese authorities would experience in terms of monitoring the bottom end 
of the trading chain.
In Kubuya’s opinion, a possible withdrawal of MONUC from Eastern DRC would have disastrous 
consequences for the security situation in and around the centres de négoce, because the Congolese 
security services (and the police des mines in particular) are probably not capable of protecting these 
centres on their own.
74 Creddho (September 2009), La démilitarisation du site de Bisie ou confl it d’intérêts entre acteurs politico-militaires, p. 14 
75 Bisie killings show minerals at heart of Congo confl ict, Global Witness press release, 18 August 2009 
76 Mai-Mai is used as a term for any community-based militia group, most of them formed locally to resist Rwandan or Rwanda-affi liated Congolese rebel groups. The 
Mai-Mai rebel groups are led by warlords, traditional tribal elders, village heads, and politically motivated resistance fi ghters.
77 The FDLR (Democratic Liberation Forces of Rwanda) is based in Eastern Congo following the fl ight of Hutu extremists to eastern Congo after their involvement in the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.
78 Creddho (September 2009), La démilitarisation du site de Bisie ou confl it d’intérêts entre acteurs-politico-militaires, Creddho, p. 14; On 11 March 2010, Global 
Witness reported that former members of the CNDP, who were in charge of the 212th brigade of the FARDC, were ‘pocketing tens of thousands of dollars per month 
from illegal taxes imposed on civilians in and around Bisie (…)’ (source: DR Congo: ex-rebels take over mineral trade extortion racket, Global Witness press release, 
11 March 2010)
79 According to Kubuya, there was a real risk that the ‘centres de négoce’ would start functioning as ‘laundering centres’. He feared that minerals passing through those 
centres would always receive a ‘green label’, even if their exact origin had not been certifi ed by a reliable Congolese state service.
21
According to Anny Mbombo, the head of an NGO working on research concerning natural 
resources, ERND (Environnement, Ressources Naturelles et Développement) it is highly doubtful 
whether government institutions such as the Ministry of Mines and SAESSCAM are up to the 
task of implementing new traceability mechanisms such as the iTSCi-project. She claims that the 
visibility of these two institutions on the ground is very limited and suggests that this is probably due 
to a shortage of personnel. Moreover, Mbombo indicated that the weakness of the Ministry of Mines 
and SAESSCAM is illustrated, amongst other things, by the fact that they do not seem to have 
reliable data on the number of diggers, and by the fact that they fail to organize the distribution of 
artisanal mining permits in a satisfying manner. Without such permits the artisanal miners become 
illegal, even though they depend on mining for their survival. Not only do agents of the Ministry of 
Mines adjust the prices for the sale of these permits at their own discretion (so that they were able to 
pocket a commission on the sale of each permit), but they are also unable to prevent large groups of 
diggers from working in the mines without any form of offi  cial permission whatsoever.80
Jean-Pierre Buledi, the research coordinator of the NGO CEDAC (Centre d’Etude, de 
Documentation et d’Animation Civique), which works with issues concerning civil education, 
transparency and democracy, hopes that public servants expected to implement the traceability 
mechanism(s) would receive a decent training in advance. He says that many members of the 
public administration suff er from a lack of schooling and are poorly informed about the latest 
rules and regulations in the mining business. According to Buledi, the success of the traceability 
mechanism(s) will also depend – to a very large extent – on the way mining offi  cials would be paid 
by the Congolese government. He thought it is highly unlikely that badly paid offi  cials would play a 
positive role in the initiatives to increase the level of transparency in the mining sector.81 It is widely 
known that poorly paid offi  cials tend to rely on corrupt practices. 
Finally, Manassé Shubazi Kabambe, who’s the director of the Bukavu-based study centre BEGEM 
that is having a prominent role in the ITRI’s tin supply chain initiative82, acknowledged that 
Congolese state services overseeing the mining sector are struggling with a lack of personnel and are 
forced to work under diffi  cult conditions. Manassé stated that the Congolese authorities had taken 
a long time to get genuinely involved in the traceability mechanism designed by the tin industry, 
but he is hopeful that things would change for the better given the new agreement that was signed 
between ITRI and the Congolese government in the beginning of June 2010. According to Manassé, 
there are indications that, slowly but gradually, progress is being made on the implementation of 
ITRI’s traceability mechanism. He pointed out that in South Kivu, the fi rst batches of labelled 
and traceable mineral bags have already been sold to buying houses in Bukavu, whereas, in North 
Kivu, representatives of all stakeholders in the project had just paid a visit to the mine at Bisie with 
a view to evaluating the situation on the ground and preparing the start of the next phase of the 
project. Although Manassé agrees that the iTSCi project could only work if all participants on the 
government side receive proper training in advance, he said that (in South Kivu) mining offi  cials 
had already been trained for the tasks they are expected to carry out in the context of the project. 
Moreover, he suggested that even mineral buyers and managers of buying houses have already been 
informed about the traceability approach and about their role in the project.83
80 Anny Mbombo, ERND, interview in Bukavu 24 May 2010 
81 Jean-Pierre Buledi, CEDAC, interview in Bukavu 24 May 2010 
82 BEGEM is doing the actual tagging/labelling of the bags of minerals and keeping the register
83 E-mail from Manassé Shubazi Kabambe, BEGEM, 1 July 2010
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3.4 MODERATE OPTIMISM AMONG CONGOLESE MINING OFFICIALS
Congolese offi  cials involved in the implementation of traceability mechanisms for minerals 
originating from Eastern DRC said they were moderately optimistic about the chances of success 
of the various reform initiatives. While they admitted that there was still a lot of work to be done 
and acknowledged that the context in which they had to operate was complex and diffi  cult, they 
still found it encouraging that a genuine debate had come into being between the diff erent groups 
involved with widely diff erent views and interests. According to Jean-Jacques Duga, the local director 
of SAESSCAM in South Kivu, it was too early to sum up the strong and the weak points of the 
traceability mechanisms. In an e-mail he writes: “We realize that the work is not easy given the 
complexity of the political and economic situation in our country as a whole and in South Kivu in 
particular. … It’s pointless to continue complaining about each other without changing one’s own 
behaviour.”
Adolphe Saninga Lubango, the head of offi  ce of the provincial mining division in the territory of 
Shabunda, told IPIS that none of the initiatives to reform the Congolese mining sector had yet been 
carried out in the area for which he was responsible. He argued that this was due to the ongoing war 
in Shabunda: “… the authority of the state … has not yet been restored in the territory of Shabunda 
due to the presence of national armed groups and FDLR (elements) who prevent the initiatives 
of the provincial mining division and the offi  ce of the mining district from being implemented 
everywhere.” However, Saninga reported that the provincial mining division and the district offi  ce 
of mining have recently jointly taken the initiative to bring artisanal miners together to prepare them 
for the creation of mining cooperatives. Th e creation of mining cooperatives is something that is 
encouraged by the Congolese state as a way to formalize the mining sector. 
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4. BANNING EASTERN DRC MINERALS: 
RESPONSIBLE OR NOT?
Since 2001 there have been eff orts to trace companies that take economic advantages of the mineral 
trade that partly supports diff erent armed groups in the confl ict in Eastern DRC. Some NGOs, as 
well as the UN Panels of Experts, demand that the extraction of minerals in Eastern DRC has to 
be placed under strict supervision, and minerals from mines controlled by armed groups should be 
boycotted by consumers of fi nished products utilizing these minerals. Th e arguments put forward 
in their reports, that there is a close connection between the violence and suff ering of the civilian 
population living in the mining zones in Eastern DRC and the control exercised in these areas by 
diff erent armed groups, are certainly valid.84 
A lot of attention has been given to the fact that we all, as consumers purchasing personal electronic 
devices, are linked to the confl ict in Eastern DRC. Many argue that we must demand that companies 
stop buying confl ict minerals and so cut off  the funding of armed groups. Skeptics of the idea that 
ending the trade will stop the violence say it will only hurt an already extremely weak economy and 
make the local population suff er even more.85 Th ey underline the fact that more than two-thirds 
of the revenue of a province like North Kivu is from mineral exports.86 Even though none of the 
NGOs or the legal initiatives actually promote an embargo in the sense of ending the mineral trade 
from the whole of Eastern DRC or even the whole of the DRC, many point out that it is likely to 
be the eff ect, especially before initiatives for a trustworthy certifi cation schemes are in place. Th e 
local research-based Pole Institute is of the opinion that the dilemma becomes even greater when the 
mining industry is criminalized without off ering an economic alternative to a possible boycott of 
these minerals. 
Consumer campaigns against confl ict minerals have been launched, among others, by American 
Enough campaign87 and international NGOs such as Global Witness.88 Th ey call on companies 
within IT, aerospace and other industries using minerals from Eastern DRC to issue strict due 
diligence routines if they continue the sourcing. “Companies should need to do their due diligence 
work if they source in the DRC so that they are not funding these armed groups. Otherwise they 
should not source there. It is as simple as that,” says Mike Davies from Global Witness.89 Others 
such as Resource Consulting Services and Pact suggest that banning the trade in confl ict minerals 
is unlikely to sever the link between mineral sourcing and the confl ict. Since mineral extraction in 
the DRC is poorly monitored and the resulting metals are undiff erentiated commodities, it is also 
argued that it is relatively easy to get around bans.90 
Steve Hege, a program offi  cer of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) at New York 
University and Jason Stearns, Phd. candidate at Yale have written a proposal for a Th ird Party 
84 Pole Institute (March 2010), Blood Minerals: the Criminalization of an Economic Sector in Eastern DRC; Global Witness (July 2009), Faced with a gun – What can 
you do?; Reports from the UN Expert Panel, see http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1533/egroup.shtml.
85 Advocates for this opinion are found at the Resource Consulting Services, a research-based consultancy with a good reputation for in-depth analysis and assess-
ments on issues concerning natural resources and development, see www.resourceglobal.co.uk, the Pole Institute, a research-based organisation with considerable 
experience in research and consultation regarding peace, development and trade in natural resources in the Eastern DRC region, www.pole-institute.org, IPIS, one of 
the organizations which are most experienced in undertaking reliable research onnatural resources issues in Eastern DRC, www.ipisresearch.be and the Öko-Institut, 
a leading European research and consultancy institution working for a sustainable future employing more than 125 staff, http://www.oeko.de/aktuelles/dok/544.php. 
86 Pole Institute (March 2010), Blood Minerals: the Criminalization of an Economic Sector in Eastern DRC 
87 The Enough project, Center for American Progress, http://www.enoughproject.org, accessed 3 June 2010 
88 Global Witness, http://www.globalwitness.org/pages/en/democratic_republic_of_congo.html, accessed 9 June 2010 
89 Mike Davies, Global Witness, interview on 23 April 2010
90 Business for Social Responsibility (May 2010), Confl ict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo:
 Supply Chain, Government and Capacity Building – An Overview for Participants in the DRC Confl ict Minerals Forum
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Monitoring and Enforcement Mechanism for the mineral trade in Eastern DRC.91 Hege explained 
that due diligence is critical to ensure that the private sector take ownership and responsibility 
for their economic participation in the supply chain. He thinks however, that companies “will 
likely never have the suffi  cient local knowledge to actually trace the complex and malleable web of 
networks that defi ne the mineral trade in Eastern DRC”.92 Most likely this will lead to a situation 
in which companies will instead avoid purchasing minerals from Eastern DRC. Hege and Stearns 
question the viability of asking all individual companies undertaking due diligence work in the fi eld 
in Eastern DRC. “Due diligence is a good idea in theory, but very diffi  cult to implement given the 
corrupt administrative apparatus it would have to rely on and the security situation in the mining 
areas”, they write.93
In addition, many have voiced serious concerns about the consequences of the new US legislation 
on confl ict minerals for the people of the DRC. According to the Pole Institute, the US law risks 
causing considerable economic damage in Eastern Congo. Th e end eff ect can be the opposite of that 
intended: pushing people towards confl ict rather than leading them towards peace. Th erefore the 
Pole Institute has called for a broad cross-border consultation on the ground in order to fi nd practical 
ways of promoting responsibility in the natural resource trade which develop the economy instead 
of killing it.94 Also, a representative of a US law fi rm, David Levine of McDermott Will & Emery, is 
quoted in the Financial Times: “If the law is implemented to require manufacturers whose product 
components contain confl ict minerals to track back the sources of the materials to establish an audit 
trail that could be a task of mind-boggling complexity”.95 According to the US Enough Project, 
reporting will be defi ned in regulations, with feedback from industry groups, and won’t be required 
for several years to ensure that the regulations are “reasonable and achievable”.96 For the moment a 
multi-stakeholder group in close contact with the US Securities and Exchange Commission SEC has 
taken up diff erent tasks to give input to the implementation of the law in the best way.97
Pact has been consulting many local stakeholders within the iTSCi-pilot project. Karen Hayes writes: 
“We have found that people are quite angry that there is a risk of an embargo about which they have 
not been consulted, and a great deal of worry that there is not a reasonable timeframe in which to 
meet the requirements. Th ey consider that this would lead to a loss of their livelihoods, would force 
them to migrate to new areas, it could cause some to turn to crime, and they feel they would then 
have to operate in a more clandestine manner in which they are more vulnerable to exploitation and 
confl ict.” 98
One important question is whether it is actually possible today to source ‘confl ict-free’ minerals from 
Eastern DRC. Th ere are varying degrees of involvement from armed groups, just like there are also 
varying degrees of legality. IPIS estimates that for the time being is that there is not a single mine 
91 Center on International Cooperation (CIC) (January 2010), Independent Oversight for Mining in the Eastern Congo? 
 A Proposal for a Third Party Monitoring & Enforcement Mechanism, Jason Stearns, Phd. candidate at Yale University and Steve Hege, CIC Research Associate, New 
York University
92 Steve Hege, Research Associate, Center for International Cooperation (CIC), New York University, e-mail interview on 10 May 2010
93 Center on International Cooperation (CIC) discussion paper, Mining and Confl ict in the Eastern DR Congo
94 Johnson, Dominic (19 July 2010), Killing the economy in the name of peace? The new US ”confl ict minerals” legislation for the DRC, Pole Institute, http://www.
pole-institute.org/site%20web/echos/echo138.htm, accessed 8 May 2010
95 Financial Times (17 August 2010), Businesses resist ‘confl ict minerals’ law, Jean Eaglesham and Jeremy Lemer in New York, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/36cdb886-
aa3b-11df-9367–00144feabdc0.html
96 The Enough Project, FAQ about the confl ict minerals regulations, http://www.enoughproject.org/special-topics/understanding-confl ict-minerals-provisions, accessed 
23 August 2010
97 The makeITfair project participates in monthly multi-stakeholder calls where information is shared among organizations and industry on developments around 
the confl ict mineral issue. From July 2010 in the US groups are busy getting involved in the implementation of the legislation, taking on different tasks and fi nding 
defi nitions etc.
98 Karen Hayes, Director of Corporate Community Engagement for the Africa Region, Pact, interview on 20 August 2010
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in Eastern DRC where there are no 
security problems at all.99 In other words, if 
there are very strict requirements regarding 
taxes to armed groups and no involvement 
of armed groups in the mineral trade at all, 
at the moment, it means it is not possible 
to source minerals from Eastern DRC at 
all. Th is is an option that Karen Hayes 
foresees could lead to more insecurity in 
the region: “Potential exclusion of mines 
from the traceability system with resulting 
loss of their legitimate market could have 
major impacts. Th is could leave mines 
with the options of (a) closure – resulting 
in loss of livelihoods, migration forced by 
economic need, new resource confl icts as 
miners try to fi nd new sites, new debt as 
new sites are developed, etc; (b) continued 
mining and trading but with only illegal 
actors or buyers who are unscrupulous 
about their sourcing; (c) a move away from 
the restrictive tin/tantalum/wolframite 
market towards the more lucrative and 
secretive gold mines and markets where 
traceability is a huge challenge.”100
4.2 LOCAL VIEWS AND OPINIONS: RESISTANCE AGAINST THE EMBARGO OPTION
So even if no one is directly in favour of a boycott of minerals from Eastern DRC, this may very 
well be the result of recent legislative and due diligence demands. During interviews in Goma and 
Bukavu in May 2010, IPIS encountered very few representatives of civil society groups who were 
in favour of an embargo on minerals from Eastern DRC. One of the only interviewees who really 
stood up for the embargo option was Alphonse Muhindo, who worked for the Goma-based offi  ce of 
the environmental organisation, the ‘Réseau pour la Conservation et la Réhabilitation des Ecosystèmes 
Forestiers’ (CREF).101 According to Muhindo, the intentions of the proponents of the embargo 
scenario at the international level were honourable. He argued that the latter wanted to suppress the 
illegal exploitation of natural resources, to lower the intensity of the confl ict in Eastern DRC, to 
discourage armed groups preying on local mining activities, and to give the Congolese government 
the time needed to embark on a profound reform of the country’s mining sector.102 
By far most informants questioned the usefulness of an embargo. Th e most outspoken critic 
was Désiré Segahungu, the chairman of the business association, Fédération des Entreprises du 
Congo (FEC), in North Kivu. In Segahungu’s opinion, “an embargo would be dramatic for the 
99 Jeroen Cuvelier, Researcher, IPIS, e-mail to Swedwatch on 11 August 2010
100 Karen Hayes, Director of Corporate Community Engagement for the Africa Region, Pact, interview on 20 August 2010
101 The CREF network, created in May 2003, is composed of 21 organizations working on environmental issues in the province of North Kivu (source: the website of 
Congolese civil society: www.societecivile.cd/node/1651, accessed 9 June 2010)
102 Alphonse Muhindo, CREF, interview in Goma on 20 May 2010 
Local tin ore (cassiterite) trader. © Enough Project
26
local economy”. Th e main reason for this, he said, “Is that the mining sector is currently the most 
important earner of foreign currency in Eastern DRC”. He was convinced that an embargo would 
inevitably lead to the destruction of the most important source of foreign currency, which, in turn, 
would have a negative impact on the purchase and import of goods from abroad. In addition to 
this, he feared that an embargo might have pernicious consequences for the security situation in the 
region. “Considering that mining is currently one of the only sources of income for unemployed 
youngsters in North and South Kivu,” he noted, “there is a serious risk that some of these youngsters 
will join armed groups if an embargo prevents them from making money through mining or 
mining-related activities.” Segahungu accused the UN Panel of Experts and NGOs such as Global 
Witness of showing all participants in the local mining business in a bad light, while he regretted 
that the publication of their reports had coincided with the emergence of the global fi nancial crisis. 
He believed the latter two developments have been responsible for the fact that many Goma-based 
buying houses are having serious problems fi nding foreign buyers for their minerals.103 
Following the example of their colleagues in Goma, most members of civil society groups in Bukavu 
rejected the idea of a general mineral embargo for Eastern DRC. Cyprien Birhingingwa Mugabo, 
the coordinator of the NGO Cenadep in Bukavu and the chairman of a network of civil society 
organisations in South Kivu, stated that an embargo would not help to solve the many problems 
associated with artisanal mining in his province. He suggested that an embargo would probably give 
rise to massive fraud, while it would also rob local youngsters of a signifi cant source of income.104 
Christian Alissi, a collaborator of the religious organisation Groupe Jérémie in Bukavu, who works 
with civil education, human rights, media & communication, peace & democracy and female 
emancipation, reiterated the argument put forward by Désiré Segahungu (FEC / North Kivu) with 
regard to the negative impact of a mineral embargo on trade in the region. He pointed out that 
the emergence of mining centres had given rise to new trade fl ows, which involved a massive infl ux 
of goods such as foodstuff s and medicine into the interior. He suspected that an embargo would 
probably cause these trade fl ows to dry up and would thus have a negative eff ect on commercial 
activities in the region.105 
Finally, Descartes Mponge, a researcher for the Bukavu-based NGO ‘Environnement, Ressources 
Naturelles et Développement’ (ERND), deplored the fact that some stakeholders in the mining 
business in the Kivu region were deliberately spreading false information about the embargo 
issue. He emphasized that, contrary to what was generally assumed, Global Witness and other 
international NGOs were actually not in favour of a general mineral ban in Eastern DRC.106 
As explained above, this is true; however, a de facto result of strict requirements and recent US 
legislation may very well result in an unintended embargo.
4.3 WHAT DO COMPANIES THINK OF THE EMBARGO OPTION?
As discussed above, companies may favor banning “confl ict minerals” from their individual or 
industry supply chains because, if eff ective, it would simplify their own risk management and 
mitigate the risk of negative publicity related to the DRC confl ict.107 Finnwatch reported in 2007 
103 Désiré Segahungu, FEC, North Kivu, interview in Goma on 20 May 2010 
104 Cyprien Birhingingwa Mugabo, Cenadep, interview in Bukavu on 26 May 2010 
105 Christian Alissi N, Groupe Jérémie, interview in Bukavu on 22 May 2010
106 Descartes Mponge, ERND, interview in Bukavu on 24 May 2010 
107 Business for Social Responsibility (May 2010), Confl ict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo: Supply Chain, Government and Capacity Building – An 
Overview for Participants in the DRC Confl ict Minerals Forum
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how tin ore from North Kivu was exported by numerous international, mainly Belgian, marketing 
fi rms via Uganda to the ports of Kenya and Tanzania. From there, cassiterite (tin-ore) was shipped 
mainly to Asian smelters: Th ailand, Malaysia, India and perhaps to China.108 Following intense 
advocacy pressure, several companies in the trade, such as Traxys and Th aisarco, state that they 
suspended purchasing from Eastern DRC in 2009.109 
For this report, Finnwatch and Swedwatch sent questions to fi ve international marketing fi rms and 
one smelter110, out of which two (Sodexmines111 and Trademet112) answered. Sodexmines said that 
they have not stopped their activities in the DRC since they know their suppliers are trustworthy 
and supervise them. Trademet is aware that Traxys and Th aisarco have temporarily suspended buying 
from Eastern DRC and state that it has been winding down for a few months in order to clarify what 
could be done or not in a way that will satisfy everybody. However, Trademet is still present in the 
Congolese market. Th e UN Group of Experts investigated Sodexmines in Goma in 2009 and found 
their business was not involved with armed groups, according to Sodexmines. Trademet participates 
in the iTSCi programme. 
Both Sodexmines and Trademet are of the opinion that an embargo on natural resources from 
Eastern DRC would have a negative impact on the Congolese population. According to Trademet 
there is no international embargo in place yet, but “there is intense advocacy pressure which, whether 
right or not, is trying to push things in that way”. Sodexmines believes that a ban would lead to a 
new rebellion in the region. Sodexmines has noticed that when there are crises on the international 
market or when mineral production is down due to rain or technical problems, people are seriously 
aff ected. “Th e whole population in this region lives from minerals and it is the only income that the 
locals have,” said Edwin Raes, director of Sodexmines. 
Sodexmines is prepared to get involved in any attempt to make the business more transparent and 
legitimate. Trademet is already involved here. “We are a small company, employing three people, and 
part of some of these certifi cation programs and funding some of them. We are teaching our suppliers 
how to follow all these rules, but this ‘clean up’ will not happen in one day – these are all medium 
term projects which in my view will take from one to three years,” said Freddy Muylaert, director of 
Trademet.
Th e reaction of local traders and buying houses to the new US confl ict minerals legislation for the 
DRC seems to be very strong. John Kanyoni, an established mineral trader in Goma and president 
of the Association of Comptoirs in North Kivu, said in a letter to the Economic Section of the 
US embassy in Kinshasa on 16 July that he was “totally shocked”. Th e measures passed by the US 
Congress, he continued, were “in fact an embargo on materials from the Great Lakes Region... and 
even the whole African continent...”.113 (Since the law also applies to countries bordering the DRC, it 
aff ects many other African countries.)
Th e issue of an intended or unintended boycott of minerals from Eastern DRC or even from the 
whole of the DRC is something which the EICC and GeSI is clearly aware of. “Our intention is 
108 FinnWatch (December 2007), Connecting Components, Dividing Communities – Tin production for consumer electronics in the DR Congo and Indonesia, p. 18–20, 
35–39 
109 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 27, 33 
110 Finnwatch and Swedwatch sent questions to fi ve marketing fi rms (Metmar, SDE/Sodexmines, Shamika Resources, Trademet, Traxys) and to one smelter (Thaisar-
co).
111 Edwin Raes, Director, Sodexmines/SDE, e-mail to Finnwatch on 28 July 2010
112 Freddy Muylaert, Director, Trademet, e-mail to Finnwatch on 23 June 2010
113 Johnson, Dominic (19 July 2010), Killing the economy in the name of peace? The new US ”confl ict minerals” legislation for the DRC, Pole Institute
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not to shut off  trade from the DRC; however, the quickest path to confl ict-free may be to source 
from outside the region,” says Jerry Meyers of Intel, co-chair in the Extractive Workgroup.114 When 
it comes to individual electronics companies, it seems that much of the present eff ort comes down 
to asking for assurance from suppliers that they do not source from the DRC. Th is is despite the 
contradictory fact that none of the electronics companies publicly supports a boycott of minerals 
from the DRC as a whole. 
A selection of interviews with consumer electronics companies illustrate how the industry thinks 
about this issue. 
Sony Ericsson has requested its suppliers to report how they make sure tantalum is not originating 
from “confl ict mines”. Even though SE argue that they are not against sourcing from Eastern DRC, 
or in favour of a boycott, directives to their suppliers of components containing tantalum have 
led the suppliers to guarantee not sourcing any tantalum from the DRC.115 Th e tin supply chain 
is another and more diffi  cult issue, according to SE. “We buy electronic components from around 
1,500 suppliers. Most components consist of small quantities of tin. Th ere is no way that we could 
follow up where all of these suppliers source their tin. It is not viable,” says Mats Pellbäck-Sharp. 
Instead he favors working within the industry cooperation group, EICC and GeSI and therefore 
intends to become more active in GeSI’s Extractive Workgroup.116 
Nokia says the company is an active member of iTSCi project and GeSI/EICC Extractives 
Workgroup and is currently participating in the smelter validations. Nokia also says that it does 
not ban or boycott Congolese minerals as such, but it has banned minerals from confl ict areas 
such as Eastern DRC. According to Nokia’s website, the company asks for “written assurance from 
its suppliers whose components contain tantalum, tungsten117 and tin that these materials do not 
originate from the confl ict areas in DRC”. At the same time Nokia says it is concerned about the 
impact on local people of a ban on minerals from the DRC confl ict areas and means that this issue 
has to be addressed simultaneously with the development of audit processes. According to Nokia it 
continues to trace its raw materials and participate in industry eff orts like the EICC/GeSI extractives 
smelter audits.118
Hewlett-Packard (HP) has recently investigated its supply chain in order to fi nd out if it uses 
“confl ict minerals” in their products in breach of their policy. So far the answers collected have 
not shown any evidence of minerals from the DRC. However, HP says: “Despite this feedback, 
there is no certifi cation mechanism currently available that can assure us that the metals used in our 
products are not sourced from mineral trade associated with the confl ict in the DRC”. Th at is why 
HP works actively in the EICC/GeSI’s Extractives Workgroup. HP openly supports the current 
legislative eff orts in the US. “We believe that legislation … can play a role in stimulating demand for 
supply chains free of confl ict minerals. As such, HP supports the objective of legislative or market 
instruments that encourage the development of an internationally recognized, independently 
monitored, cross-industry approach to ensuring that metals are not sourced from mineral trade 
associated with the confl ict in the DRC.”119
114 Jerry Meyers, Program Manager, Intel, e-mail to Swedwatch on 18 August 2010
115 Mats Pellbäck Sharp, Head of Corporate Sustainability, Sony Ericsson, interview on 8 June 2010
116 Mats Pellbäck Sharp foresees this to happen within the autumn of 2010.
117 Tungsten = wolframite
118 Mika Kiiskinen, Senior Manager, Social & Ethical Issues Management, Nokia, e-mail to Finnwatch on 31 August 2010
119 Hewlett-Packard’s website, Human rights in minerals mining in Central Africa, http://www.hp.com/hpinfo/globalcitizenship/society/supplychain/minerals.html, 
accessed 16 August 2010
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5.  A STRONGER VOICE FOR CIVIL SOCIETY 
GROUPS IN THE KIVUS 
According to Resource Consulting Services, a research organisation, local civil society groups have 
little say in the current discussions on Eastern DRC’s mineral sector, yet they represent the people 
that are most vulnerable to change within the sector. Support for these civil society groups, to give 
them a voice at international, regional and national discussions, is key to ensuring that policies are 
relevant to local people and do not cause unintended adverse eff ects. In some cases, this may require 
signifi cant capacity building and support to ensure the representatives can make a meaningful 
contribution. According to them, the Congolese government and civil society, as well as the 
private sector operating in the DRC, are those stakeholder groups who should generate a higher 
development dividend from the DRC’s mineral resources for generations to come.120   
One of the outcomes of a major gathering of multi-stakeholders in a forum about DRC Confl ict 
Minerals in Washington in May 2010 was that there is an urgent need to take into account the 
perspectives of local stakeholders within the DRC. According to the Pole Institute, it remains to be 
seen to what extent local Congolese stakeholders will be involved not just in the work on the ground, 
but also in the debate at the international level. Even the modest direct impact of mineral trade 
reform is unlikely to be achieved if traceability, due diligence and certifi cation schemes are not set up 
together with the local population and do not win local understanding and backing, says Dominic 
Johnson at the Pole Institute.121 He believes that bringing local people back in are key to the success 
of reform programmes for the mineral trade in Eastern DRC.
Moreover, Dominic Johnson argues that the whole underlying assumption that the problems of 
Eastern Congo can be solved by strengthening the government side in the confl ict and by allowing 
this side to impose ‘order’, is both wrong and dangerous. He emphasises that the Congolese state 
throughout history has been more on the side of private interests than the general welfare of the 
people. Th erefore it is of utmost importance to involve civil society and local population in Eastern 
DRC instead of taking sides and simply strengthening Kinshasa-based government offi  cials. Johnson 
argues that otherwise, international initiatives may instead actually create new grounds for confl ict.122
Several local stakeholders complained during interviews that policy makers at the national and 
international level had failed to consult them about their plans to reform the Congolese mining 
sector. Th ey regretted that only a limited number of civil society groups were able to participate 
in high-level talks about the aforementioned reform measures. Moreover, they were concerned 
about the fact that stakeholders at the lowest level of the trading chain – such as artisanal miners 
and traders – were insuffi  ciently organized to be able to defend their interests in a meaningful way. 
Th ey considered this lack of organization all the more worrisome because the same group of people 
also lacked knowledge about their rights and duties in the mining sector.123 Th e iTSCi-project has 
undetaken some consultation with local stakeholders, including multi-stakeholder meetings in Goma 
and Bukavu, within their pilot project. Th ey intend to enlarge this as the project gets established, 
according to Karen Hayes at Pact.124
120 Garrett, N. et al. (May 2010), Promoting Legal Mineral Trade in Africa’s Great Lakes Region, Resource Consulting Services, p. 21, 85 
121 Johnson, Dominic (August 2010), Who’s in Charge? Putting the Mineral Trade in Eastern DRC under International Control: An Overview, Pole Institute  
122 Ibid. p 21.
123 One collaborator of an NGO in Bukavu had a well-chosen expression for the situation he encountered during his work in the mining areas. He said that Eastern DRC 
was not characterized by a ‘geological scandal’ (scandale géologique), but by an ‘educational scandal’ (scandale d’éducation) (source: Descartes Mponge, ERND, 
interview in Bukavu on 24 May 2010 
124 Karen Hayes, Director of Corporate Community Engagement for the Africa Region, Pact, interview on 20 August 2010
30
Cassiterite mining in Maniema province. © International Peace Information Service IPIS
5.1 THE NEED FOR IMPROVED SENSITIZATION AND ORGANIZATION OF STAKEHOLDERS AT 
THE GRASSROOTS LEVEL
Despite the fact that all the Congolese civil society organizations Groupe Jérémie, Réseau CREF, 
Justice pour Tous, Femmes pour la Paix et les Droits Humains and ALEFEM , Association de Lutte 
contre l’Exploitation des Femmes et Enfants dans les Mines, have directly or indirectly been involved in 
work concerning the mining sector, are advocates for human rights, and have documented violations 
against artisanal miners, none of the groups have been invited to take part in talks about reforming 
the Congolese mining sector. According to some informants in Bukavu, who preferred to speak off  
the record, one of the reasons why some NGOs received invitations for such events while others 
did not was that civil society groups in South Kivu were divided into two camps. Th e fi rst camp 
was said to be composed of NGOs that continued to denounce abuses in the mining sector, despite 
the fact that the Congolese authorities and a considerable number of economic operators in the 
mining sector were prepared to talk about initiatives to clean up the mining business. Th e second 
camp is said to consist of Congolese NGOs that preferred to concentrate on solutions instead of 
carrying on with the identifi cation of problems in the Congolese mining sector. In the opinion 
of the aforementioned informants, it seems plausible that policy makers do not want to make life 
diffi  cult for themselves and therefore prefer to invite NGOs adopting a ‘constructive’ attitude and are 
refraining from harsh criticism of continuing abuses in the mining sector. 
Nevertheless, despite their diff erences of opinion about the best ways to solve the multitude of 
problems associated with mineral resource exploitation in Eastern DRC, most civil society groups 
in North and South Kivu argue that it is necessary to do something about the weak position of 
people working in and around the mines, far away from the decision-making centres of Kinshasa, 
New York, Brussels and Paris. According to Didier de Failly of the Bukavu-based research institute 
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BEST, it is of crucial importance to avoid stigmatization of ordinary people who work as artisanal 
miners in order to make ends meet. He said that the buying houses do not deserve to be blamed for 
the chaotic circumstances in which mining activities take place. In de Failly’s opinion, they should 
rather receive technical assistance from external actors, such as geologists, so that their conditions 
can be improved.125 In a similar vein, Eric Kajemba of the Observatoire Gouvernance et Paix (OGP) 
noted it was high time to do something about the harsh circumstances in which creuseurs have to 
dig minerals. Although he welcomed the creation of mining cooperatives126, he said there is still a 
lot to be done in terms of promoting better forms of organization among low-level stakeholders.127 
Ezra Mutima Kambale of the Goma-based human rights organisation Réseau d’Action Citoyen pour 
la Démocratie (RACID) shared Kajemba’s concern about the need for better forms of organization 
among actors at the bottom end of the trading chain. Kambale had the impression that many 
existing cooperatives are not functioning properly: their leaders fail to comply with offi  cial rules 
and regulations, while they frequently manage their organizations in a strictly hierarchical manner, 
off ering their members very few opportunities to speak their minds on the modus operandi of the 
cooperatives.128
Several interviewees said that local NGOs have already taken a number of steps to strengthen the 
position of stakeholders at the grassroots level. Balume Anaclet of the Bukavu-based Action pour 
la Promotion et la Défense des Personnes Défavorisées (APRODEPED) said that his organisation is 
involved in the organization of law clinics where diff erent actors in the mining business in Eastern 
DRC can get legal advices. Lawyers working for APRODEPED regularly go into the fi eld where they 
serve as focal points for complaints submitted by people at the grassroots level. Apart from playing 
a mediating role in disputes between for instance, artisanal miners and traders, APRODEPED also 
made eff orts to protect the miners against illegal taxes.129
Aloys Tegera said that the Pole Institute had made an attempt to promote money saving strategies 
among artisanal miners, since saving money can help the mine workers to build a more stable future 
for themselves and their families. According to Alphonse Muhindo, the Réseau Ressources Naturelles 
(a network of Congolese NGOs working on natural resource issues) organized a workshop on the 
Congolese mining code in November 2009, together with the Congolese Ministry of Mines.130 
For his part, Raoul Kitungano of the Bukavu-based ‘Justice pour Tous’ said that his organization 
highlights the limitations of the Congolese mining code by talking to the local press, delivering 
speeches and performing critical sketches. Th is kind of work helps local people to understand their 
legal rights and which new laws are needed to end their exploitation.131 
5.2 THE DANGERS OF IGNORING THE SOCIO-CULTURAL CONTEXT IN WHICH MINING-
RELATED ACTIVITIES TAKE PLACE
Although most of the interviewees were pleased with the fact that the three main parties in the 
debate on mineral resource exploitation in Eastern DRC – the Congolese authorities, private 
companies and civil society groups – were fi nally talking about solutions to the problems of confl ict 
minerals and illicit mineral traffi  cking, there was some resentment about the fact that policy makers 
125 Didier de Failly, BEST, interview in Bukavu on 26 May 2010 
126 Eric Kajemba mentioned the following cooperatives: COMELU, COPAMIC, COMYABU and the Coopérative des artisans de Luwinji. 
127 Erick Kajemba, OGP, intreview in Bukavu on 25 May 2010 
128 Ezra Mutima Kambale, RACID, interview in Goma on 20 May 2010
129 Balume Anaclet, APRODEPED, interview in Bukavu on 26 May 2010. Strikingly, lawyers working for APRODEPED met with great opposition from customary 
authorities in the same region. Possibly, this opposition is due to the fact that traditional chiefs consider confl ict mediation as a source of revenue. 
130 Alphonse Muhindo, Réseau CREF, interview in Goma on 20 May 2010 
131 Raoul Kitungano, Justice pour Tous, interview in Bukavu, 22 May 2010 
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seemed to pay almost no attention to the socio-cultural context in which mining activities take 
place. A recurrent criticism of policy makers at the national and international level was that the 
latter seem to care more about the reputation of foreign companies interested in buying Congolese 
minerals than in the well-being of the people living and working in and around the mines. Th ere was 
a widespread feeling that it was high time to tackle problems such as the use of physical violence, the 
establishment of predatory taxation systems, and the creation of illicit trade monopolies by military 
actors.132 In addition to this, it was also felt that policy makers need to do something about other 
mining related issues such as land rights, forced labour and sexual violence against women, that had 
only received scant attention.
A key problem that – in the opinion of some of our respondents – deserved to receive more 
attention is that of access to land. Th e Bukavu-based NGO ‘Action pour la Paix et la Concorde’ 
(APC) said that the spectacular boom in artisanal mining over the past few years had made the 
land issue increasingly complicated. In Nyabibwe mine133, for instance, which is situated in Kalehe, 
various types of unoffi  cial agreements are being concluded between diff erent groups in the area. Th e 
APC research shows that policy makers would do well to collect more information about what is 
happening at the micro-level of society, so that they can improve the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of 
their interventions.134 
A second problem that needed more attention – according to some of our informants – is that of 
forced labour. Saidi Kubuya of the NGO Assodip in Goma said that military commanders of state 
and non-state armed groups in North Kivu try to increase their mining revenues by taking advantage 
of people’s familiarity with the system of ‘salongo’, the name for compulsory collective labour during 
the Mobutu era135. According to Kubuya, the aforementioned military commanders force miners to 
work exclusively for them at least one day a week.136 Delly Mawazo Sesete of the NGO Creddho in 
Goma pointed out that, in the territory of Lubero, the rebel group FDLR used to send out labour 
contractors to villages in the interior with the aim of fi nding young men who are prepared to work 
in the mines. Although these youngsters are allowed to keep part of the minerals for themselves, they 
are forced to relinquish a substantial part of their production to FDLR commanders.137 Th e issue of 
slave labour in the mines of Eastern DRC has recently been studied through extensive fi eld research 
by the American organisation Free the Slaves. Th e organisation found evidence of several forms of 
modern slavery in the mines, including debt bondage slavery, child soldiering and forced marriages.138
A third problem that was mentioned during the interviews is that of sexual violence against women. 
It is important to emphasize that, when IPIS did their interviews in Goma and Bukavu, there was 
a serious lack of reliable information on sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) in mining areas 
controlled by armed groups. As a result of the fact that no systematic monitoring was taking place, 
it is impossible to tell whether the number of rape victims in these areas is higher than in other parts 
of the interior.139 Still, some of our interviewees maintained that rape is a very serious problem in the 
132 Personal communication with Rachel Perks, Pact, 21 June 2010 
133 Also Dominic Johnson (Who’s in Charge?, Aug 2010, p. 23) stresses that for example in Nyabibwe there is an overwhelming risk that it might be international led 
reforms that may very well generate future confl ict since there is so much at stake and for the government to have ITRI or other powerful international actors as co-
partners means a lot. If international actors have not done enough independent consultation locally in advance they run the risk of becoming involved in the confl ict.
134 Sosténe Maliyaseme and Emery Mushagalusa, APC, interview in Bukavu on 24 May 2010
135 After a visit to China, where he witnessed how Mao Zedong forced the population to work to promote national development, Mobutu decided to apply the same 
system in Zaire. He gave orders to show the Chinese propaganda movie ‘Esprit de Yukung’ on national television and made provisions for the creation of the Zairian 
television series ‘Esprit de Salongo’, which was meant to illustrate the virtues of salongo (source: Katrien Pype (2008), The making of the Pentecostal melodrama: 
mimesis, agency and power in Kinshasa’s media world, K.U.Louvain (unpublished PhD dissertation), pp. 58–60
136 Saidi Kubuya, Assodip, interview in Goma on 21 May 2010 
137 Delly Mawazo Sesete, Creddho, interview in Goma on 21 May 2010 
138 Free the Slaves, Slavery in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.freetheslaves.net/Page.aspx?pid=579, accessed 23 August 2010
139 Personal communication with Rachel Perks, Pact, 21 June 2010 
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region as a whole, and they suggested that it is certainly one of the issues that make life very diffi  cult 
for women living close to the mines. Elysee Yohali of the Bukavu-based NGO Femmes pour la Paix et 
les Droits Humains said that rape victims in Eastern DRC are faced with several problems. Not only 
are they confronted with an indiff erent or even hostile reaction from Congolese authorities, they are 
also afraid of being repudiated by their husbands and of being stigmatized by their communities.140 
For his part, Ezra Mutimba Kambale of the NGO RACID stated that rape victims are also struggling 
with the fact that it is culturally inacceptable for women to talk about sexuality. To make things 
worse, there is oft en a great distance between where the crime is committed and the place where the 
victim can institute legal proceedings against her aggressor. As a result, many rape victims are unable 
to cover the cost of travelling to the city and staying in a hotel in order to fi le a complaint.141
140 Elysee Yohali, Femmes pour la Paix et les Droits Humains, interview in Bukavu on 25 May 2010
141 Ezra Mutimba Kambale, RACID, interview in Goma on20 May 2010
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6. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Mining in three provinces of Eastern DRC (North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema) was suddenly 
banned by President Joseph Kabila on 11th September 2010. He ordered the indefi nite suspension 
during a visit to the mining hub town of Walikale; the mining industry later confi rmed it was with 
immediate eff ect. Th e president said he wanted to weed out what he called a ”kind of mafi a” involved 
in the mining industry. According to many the ban is diffi  cult to enforce.142
Analysts say a clampdown on so called “confl ict minerals” will be diffi  cult because government 
troops are themselves heavily involved in the trade. “Previous attempts at a ban have only increased 
smuggling,” Harrison Mitchell, analyst from Resource Consulting Services, told Reuters. “It’s all 
very well to say they want to get rid of the mafi a in the mineral sector, but when the godfather is a 
powerful fi gure in Kinshasa it’s less easy,” he added, referring to what analysts say are indications that 
senior army offi  cials are heavily involved in the trade. A ban could also increase the likelihood of 
unrest in the region as tens of thousands of Congolese live off  the mining industry.143
Th e iTSCi project focused on pilot mines in South and North Kivu where a ban now seems in 
place. It appears to ITRI that mining at those sites will no longer be considered legal, so tagging 
and all associated activities to record production and prices have therefore stopped been by ITRI. 
A representative of ITRI says: “Th is all is very unfortunate as we were just getting all the aspects 
of the scheme in place. We can only hope that there is some long term benefi t to stability and the 
Congolese people, as the situation in the short term is likely to be very diffi  cult indeed.”144 
At the time of writing, however, the Minister of Mines in Congo, Martin Kabwelulu, stated in an 
article by Reuters that the suspension of mining activities would soon be lift ed. Th e minister said that 
the government would establish a commission to look into mining in the east, aft er which the ban 
would be lift ed.145
142 BBC News (11 September 2010), DR Congo bans mining in eastern provinces
143 Reuters AlertNet (13 September 2010), Congo confl ict mineral clampdown seen tough to enforce, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/LDE68C1E5.htm
144 DRC mining ban announced by President Kabila: impact in iTSCi project, ITRI press release, 13 September 2010
145 Reuters (21 September 2010), DR Congo to lift eastern mining ban soon: minister, http://www.miningweekly.com/article/drc-to-lift-eastern-mining-ban-soon-minis-
ter-2010–09–21 
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7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is clear that, although civil society groups in Goma and Bukavu welcome policy makers trying to 
‘clean up’ the mining business in Eastern DRC, they want to have a stronger voice in the debate and 
more input into initiatives that are currently taking shape. Most of our informants rejected the idea 
of an embargo on minerals from Eastern DRC, while they expressed concern about the feasibility of 
traceability mechanisms, the lack of sensitization and organization of stakeholders at the grassroots 
level. Th ey also decried the lack of attention to social problems associated with the exploitation of 
and trade in mineral resources such as land disputes, forced labour and sexual violence. Th ere is also a 
worry that international initiatives uncritically strengthen the Congolese state in a part of the 
country where trust in the state is very low due to years of corruption and state violence.
Th e most important recommendations that emerge from interviews with civil society organisations 
are:
•  Education and capacity building are needed for civil servants who will be involved in tracing and 
certifi cation projects
•  Soldiers and police need to be better paid if they are to no longer pose a threat locally
•  Additional support to artisanal miners and local people living around the mining areas is urgently 
needed
•  Support and capacity building for traders and buying houses to help them adapt to new demands
•  More focus on land rights, forced labour and sexual violence (in connection to traceability 
schemes)
•  Security needs to be improved on roads between mines and trading centres/buying houses.
Th ere has been relatively limited focus on a ‘bottom up’ approach to confl ict minerals issues in the 
DRC despite the fact that initiatives emphasize improving conditions at mines and on local trade 
routes. Some industries, governments and NGOs are working on improving local mining and 
trading, but there is much more that organisations and companies can do in this arena.146 For 
example, the two Belgian marketing fi rms interviewed expressed their interest in getting more 
involved. According to the Pole Institute, traceability schemes will only work if they are locally 
owned. So far, much of the dialogue on the issue of ‘confl ict minerals’ has been held outside the 
country and has not really involved local actors.147 It is also important to note that a whole set of 
security sector reforms need to be put in place to complement initiatives to break the circle of 
militarized mines and mining trade. It is also important to develop links between these security 
sector reforms and recent tracing or certifi cation initiatives. 
Th e recent US legislation has got support from European politicians, and there is certainly potential 
in the implementation of the legislation (research for setting up an updated confl ict map, considering 
support to build a road to the mine at Bisie, etc.). However, there is a huge risk that the law will mean 
companies avoid sourcing from the DRC and neighbouring countries, as trading with them is seen as 
too risky and complicated. Th is will not help the stability of Eastern DRC, rather the contrary. Th e 
makeITfair project recommends linking the implementation of the law to capacity building on the 
146 BSR (May 2010), Confl ict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo, p. 24
147 Dominic Johnson, Pole Institute, e-mail to Swedwatch 7 June 2010; Karen Hayes, Pact, e-mail to Swedwatch 20 August 2010
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ground, and not setting the bar too high at the beginning. According to many sources, Congolese 
stakeholders are upset that there is a risk of a mineral embargo about which they have not been 
consulted, and they also worry that there is an unrealistic time frame in which to meet the 
requirements. 
If the iTSCi scheme continues to work with Bisie and Nyabibwe mines it is of the utmost importance 
that the initiators listen to local people during implementation and promote improvements for 
communities around the mines as well. Th e scheme should not only concentrate on tracing and 
tracking the minerals. ITRI’s task will not be easy though, since both these mines remain mired 
in confl ict and human rights abuses. In addition, ITRI has so far not developed standards, which 
makes it diffi  cult to judge how well their scheme will work. Most initiatives have dual objectives: to 
be able to secure sustainably sourced minerals including non-confl ict minerals; and to improve the 
working conditions of miners while promoting sustainable livelihoods for local populations and 
environmental care. All these issues must be addressed and the central question of “what are rebel 
controlled, confl ict minerals?” needs collective refl ection.148 Th e makeITfair project stresses the need 
to include local actors in this work during the whole process.
In 2008 the makeITfair project developed a list of principles regarding the extractives phase of 
the supply chain of consumer electronics. Th is list identifi es a number of social, environmental 
and labour issues that require immediate attention, off ers a number of sustainable solutions, and 
suggests action that can be taken by electronics companies. In connection with this report we 
revised this list (see Annex 2). Th e makeITfair project would like to stress that it is not enough for 
electronics companies to track their minerals; rather it should be seen as a fi rst step. Also, getting 
written assurance from suppliers that they do not source minerals from the DRC may lead to a de 
facto embargo, which is something we do not recommend. All actors present in this area, directly or 
indirectly, should ensure that they are aware of how their presence in the region aff ects the confl ict. 
Companies need to implement a supply chain policy for minerals from confl ict areas, identify and 
respond to risks in the chain, conduct audits at smelters, and disclose their fi ndings. Companies need 
to take measures to minimize the negative impact of their presence or their sourcing in the region.
In addition, companies using the excuse that they have too many suppliers to check is not good 
enough. We also expect the electronics industry and individual companies to do their utmost 
in supporting traceability, certifi cation and capacity building projects on the ground in Eastern 
DRC. Having said that, the makeITfair project also wants to emphasize that establishing too 
strict standards without fl exibility for step-by-step improvements will most probably not help the 
situation in Eastern DRC. We urge decision makers in politics and business to ensure they involve 
local stakeholders in drawing up standards, so these are reasonable and constructive for the task in 
hand, ending the current violent confl ict and building sustainable development in the region. Local 
stakeholders should also be included in implementation and monitoring by taking into account their 
views and concerns. 
Th e organizations within the makeITfair project off er to play a role in connecting end users with 
local stakeholders and civil society in production countries. 
148 See MakeITfair publications on platinum mined in South Africa, copper and cobalt mined in DRC and Zambia, and tin mined in Indonesia. All reports are available at 
http://makeitfair.org/the-facts/reports 
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ANNEX 1 
REPRESENTATIVES OF RELEVANT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) 
IN GOMA AND BUKAVU DEALING WITH ISSUES RELATED TO NATURAL RESOURCE 
EXPLOITATION, INTERVIEWED BY IPIS. 
Name of the interviewee Name of the 
organization
Locality Field of expertise
1. Alphonse Muhindo Réseau CREF Goma Environmental issues, 
sustainable development, 
natural resource 
management
2. Désiré Segahungu FEC Nord Kivu Goma Association of economic 
operators
3.  Cyprien Birhingingwa 
Mugabo
Cenadep Bukavu Community development, 
human rights, civil education, 
environmental issues, media 
& communication
4. Christian Alissi Groupe Jérémie Bukavu Human rights, civil education, 
media & communication, 
peace & democracy, female 
emancipation, youth
5. Descartes Mponge ERND Bukavu Research on the exploitation 
of natural resources
6. Aloys Tegera Pole Institute Goma Research on peace & 
development, natural 
resource exploitation
7. Delly Mawazo Sesete Creddho Goma Environmental issues, 
democracy, human rights
8. Saidi Kubuya Assodip Goma Female emancipation, rural 
development, human rights
9. Jean-Jacques Duga SAESSCAM Bukavu Public service (mining sector)
10.  Adolphe Saninga 
Lubango 
Division des Mines Territory of Shabunda 
(South Kivu)
Public service (mining sector)
11. Anny Mbombo ERND Bukavu Research on the exploitation 
of natural resources
12. Jean-Pierre Buledi CEDAC Bukavu Civil education, transparency, 
democracy
13.  Manasse Shubazi 
Kabambe 
BEGEM Bukavu Traceability of minerals
14. Didier de Failly BEST Bukavu Research on mining issues
15. Eric Kajemba OGP Bukavu Governance, peace, natural 
resource management
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Name of the interviewee Name of the 
organization
Locality Field of expertise
16.  Ezra Mutimba 
Kambale 
RACID Goma Human rights
17. Balume Anaclet APRODEPED Bukavu Human rights
18. Raoul Kitungano Justice pour Tous Bukavu Human Rights, civil 
education, democracy
19. Deo Buuma Action pour la Paix et 
la Concorde (APC)
Bukavu Development, confl ict 
transformation, land issues
20. Elysée Yohali Femmes pour la Paix 
et les Droits Humains 
Bukavu Female emancipation, 
human rights
21. Geneviève Makito ALEFEM, Association 
de Lutte contre 
l’Exploitation des 
Femmes et Enfants 
dans les Mines.
Bukavu ALEFEM defends the 
interests of women and 
children working in the 
mines.
42
ANNEX 2: 
MAKEITFAIR’S LIST OF PRINCIPLES ON THE EXTRACTIVE PHASE OF THE ELECTRONICS 
SUPPLY CHAIN149 (FIRST VERSION FEBRUARY 2008, REVISED OCTOBER 2010)
ELECTRONICS COMPANIES SHOULD: 
1. Recognize their responsibility to extend their supply chain management to include sourcing and 
mining of metals and primary metal processing, as the industry as a whole consumes signifi cant 
quantities of various metals. Extend due diligence processes to also cover this part of the supply chain. 
Implementation of internationally accepted environmental, social and labour standards for achieving 
best practice in CR throughout the supply chain is key. 
2. Make eff orts to increase the traceability of metals. To do so, companies should map their supply 
chain down to the extractives phase and set up a system to periodically update the supply chain for 
metals used. It is especially advised to identify the smelters, as they are key actors in supply networks in 
this aspect, and to require them to make demands on the mining companies and traders they are 
sourcing from. Th is is in order to verify that the minerals they buy conform to national laws and 
international standards for human rights and the environment (see point 3).
3. Set up requirements for the mining of metals used, based on the following basic standards relevant 
in extractive industries. Th ese requirements should be developed in collaboration with all relevant 
stakeholders. In particular, local communities and employees at mining sites should be properly 
involved; 
• Obtain free, prior and informed consent of aff ected communities. 
• Ensure that projects do not force communities off  their lands. 
• Extract minerals without the involvement of armed groups.
• Only allow security providers who have been trained in and respect human rights.
• Refrain from dumping mine waste into the ocean, rivers, lakes or streams. 
• Ensure that projects do not contaminate water, soil, or air with toxic chemicals. 
•  Cover all costs of closing down and cleaning up mine sites. Th is should include old sites not properly 
closed in the past.
•  Fully disclose information about the social and environmental impact of projects which is 
independently verifi ed.
•  Fully disclose all money fl ows to governments. 
•  Adhere to all relevant international labour standards. 
•  Take into account and minimize the environmental and social impact of energy sources powering 
mining and smelting operations. 
4. Apply due diligence with regards to confl ict areas from which minerals are sourced. Companies 
should adhere to relevant guidelines.150 A due diligence process for confl ict aspects would have to 
include tracing minerals down to the mine, and setting up systems to detect whether purchasing is done 
from mines controlled by armed groups (including taxation by armed group along the trading routes). 
149 These standards are partially based on the principles of other campaigns, such as the No Dirty Gold Campaign, the OECDs draft guidance for responsible supply chain 
management of minerals from confl ict-affected and high-risk areas and the GoodElectronics network.
150 Such as the OECDs draft guidance for responsible supply chain management of minerals from confl ict-affected and high-risk areas (DATE) and guidance presented by the 
UN Global Compact and PRI (http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Peace_and_Business/Guidance_RB.pdf ).
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For end-users it means monitoring the supply chain down to the smelters, and implementing due 
diligence work to ensure that smelters have control down to the mining site. If the risk of purchasing 
from mines “controlled” by armed groups is detected, the company should have a strategy to respond. 
Th is strategy should correspond with the nature and level of involvement of armed groups, the human 
rights abuses involved etc, where some involvement should lead to direct disengagement. However, most 
measures should include engaging proactively with local actors and working towards continuous 
improvements, rather than applying a boycott as a fi rst step. Ultimately, involvement of either rebel 
groups or state army actors is unacceptable. Th e purchase of minerals should continuously shift  to 
mining sites which respect the basic standards set out in paragraph 3.
5. Develop action plans to tackle the issues in the extractives phase of their supply chains. Such plans 
should include;
•  Risk assessments, which are independently verifi ed, to identify social, environmental and labour 
issues.
•  A strategy to use their position and their purchasing power within the supply chain to engage 
companies with more direct ties to mining companies to adhere to the principles and standards 
referred to above.
•  A strategy to join forces with other players in the electronics and mining sector, as well as in other 
end user sectors, to promote widespread adherence to best practice and the principles referred to 
above.
•  Th e inclusion of activities in mining areas within the company’s broader CR policies, such as 
capacity building programmes for local community groups or civil society organisations.  
•  Th e issuing of a public statement of concern regarding both general mining issues and specifi c cases.
•  A strategy to optimize the use of sustainable recycled materials as a substitution for wasteful 
production.
•  Measures to ensure that artisanal small scale miners are not disenfranchised or excluded from 
sourcing.
•  Measures to stop their consumption of metals sourced from lands where mining lacks community 
consent and reduce consumption of metals originating from environmentally sensitive areas. 
•  Strategies to analyze lessons learned in one mining area, and apply these in other areas. 
•  Adopt the principle of applying criteria to the mother company and not just individual mines or 
subsidiaries. 
6. Cost-sharing. Companies should make sure that all parties in the supply chain can implement the 
requested routines and improvements. If needed, they should support suppliers to invest in improved 
conditions and routines for monitoring, and for example share audit costs or provide other fi nancial 
incentives. 
7. Companies should report annually on their supply chain responsibility and disclose fi ndings and 
actions taken as a response to the fi ndings. In the reporting it should be possible to follow up how 
conditions improve.
8. Grievance mechanisms. Companies, in cooperation with other companies and stakeholders, should 
ensure that independent grievance mechanisms are in place down through the supply chain. Th ere 
should be systems to take into account complaints from local populations, individuals concerned, 
NGOs, trade unions or employees. 
 

